The Iraqi Constitution - How To Fake Democracy
This post is the result of a disagreement I had with Rob, Bat One, and 2hotel9 about the legitimacy of Iraq’s ‘democracy’ and its constitution. If they didn’t test me I wouldn’t have gone through any trouble, but I know my goddamn Poli Sci and I wasn’t going to take it sitting down. As 2Hotel9 puts it: “sparkle pacifist is gonna pee it’s panties”.
Rob said the following:
and
and I replied
See the original spat here. What I said is true. What we have over there IS technically a democracy, but the Sunni minority has been excluded and much of the recent political history there can quickly explain why we will continue to see lots of violence in this ‘democracy’ until the Sunnis are included and all the citizens can be represented not only in the government, but also in the constitution.
First, I was right and you three were all wrong. Now the substance:
Iraq gained independence from Britain in 1932, and was claimed a Republic in 1958, even though it was nothing more than a series of military strongmen, the latest who was Saddam Hussein (Israeli, 6). Saddam Hussein represented the Sunni Muslim minority, a population which constitutes only 32% compared to the 65% of the Shiite majority, or the 15-20% comprised of the Kurdish minority (CIA Iraq, 3). Saddam Hussein’s regime was dismantled, not due to preventive negotiations like South Africa, but because the United States ousted Hussein’s regime over acclaimed non-compliance with the United Nations Security Council (Israeli, 7).
Following this, a Constitutional Drafting Committee was formed, and it was expected that they would finish the constitutional draft in time for the referendum on October 15, 2005( Morrow, 9). Unfortunately, in August, the Committee was scrapped and a Leadership Council was formed with the Sunni representatives excluded from the negotiations. The draft was completed by the projected due date, and was put up to a national referendum on October 15, just as planned. The most contentious issues regarding issues like women’s rights, or how much power the regions should have, were left out of the negotiations (Phillips, 156). The draft would be nullified if two-thirds of three provinces voted against it becoming the permanent constitution (Harvard, 1205). So the Sunnis were excluded from the drafting of the constitution and then the majority (again excluding the Sunnis) voted it in.
As one might expect following Sunni exclusion from the Constitutional negotiations, the three provinces that heavily voted against it were Sunni dominated (1206). Two of the provinces, Salahudain and Anbar, voted 82% and 97% respectively against it. The third province, Ninevan, had a 55% vote against passing the draft, just barely missing the three provinces, two-third majority requirement. Even though this requirement was barely missed, Sunni opposition to the new constitutional framework was already beginning to show.
On December 15, 2005, the first parliamentary elections were held for the National Assembly. 128 seats out of 275 were won by the Shiites, the Sunnis took 44 and the Kurds 53 seats. The final constitutional framework that was passed, set up the institution of the legislature as divided into the Council of Representatives and the Council of Unions (Iraq Constitution 9-12). The Council of Representatives is elected by proportional representation for a four year term, and has the responsibility of electing the President, Prime Minister and Deputy President, by an absolute majority vote. Decisions on passing legislation are also made by the Council of Representatives, and only a simple majority vote is required. The Council of Unions is made up of representatives from the 18 provinces, and is responsible for looking over legislation that is directly pertinent to the provinces, but they have no veto power to stop legislation from passing (13). The Iraqi Central Bank, Financial Inspection Office, and the Media and Communications Agency are all responsible directly to the Council of Representatives (17).
The Iraq Constitution also mandates revenue sharing of all future profits made from oil, since oil and gas, under the new constitution, is seen as the property of all the Iraqi people (19). Revenues are to be distributed fairly all over the country. Each province is to have their own President and National Council, which are to be directly elected, but in reality, the total amount of power each province has amounts to basically nothing more than jurisdiction over their police forces. Iraq’s Constitution calls for a majoritarian system for passing legislation and electing a President, which will have dire consequences on the minority population of the Sunnis. Saddam’s disposal gave the political actors the opportunity to implement institutions and form a constitutional framework that would work towards cooperation and representation of all groups, but instead reverse marginalization has taken place through both of their majoritarian systems and policies. Majoritarianism can lead to increased conflict in deeply divided societies, [like Iraq], since certain groups may find themselves disadvantaged in terms of resources, or have policies imposed on them against their will. Majoritarian systems are okay for homogenous societies [like the U.S.], but majoritarianism is likely to exacerbate divisions in heterogeneous societies, and can even lead to civil war or secession. A positive future for the world’s most deeply divided societies can be achieved only by some variation of power sharing (241). Consociational democracy is the sort of democracy this country needs to adopt if there is to ever be cooperation and peace.
There are four main characteristics that are vital towards implementing consociational democracy. First, executive power should be shared amongst the representatives of all major groups. Second, there should be a high degree of segmental autonomy for those groups who want it. Third, there should be proportional representation in government and the civil service, and fourth, each group should have a minority veto over the most vital issues. Robert Dahl, a supporter of consociational democracy, advises that there needs to be mutual security for cooperation to happen (Dahl, 118). Consociational democracy provides mutual security and minority protection. Some academics worry that consociational democracy may lead to deadlock since each group has a minority veto. This may be the case, but for many deeply divided societies, especially like Iraq, the alternative to a situation of deadlock is civil war. Also, the minority veto is a mutual veto and because of this it will be used conservatively since each segment understands that if it does not use it in such a way, opposing segments will block their legislation next time.
Iraq needs to adopt three of the requirements. It already has proportional representation in government, but lacks it in civil service. Proportional representation is not enough to guarantee representation when one group has more than 50% of the population (158). Proportional representation may make minority inclusion more likely, but it does not guarantee it. South Africa, for example, does have a veto for the legislation that is pertinent to regions, but unfortunately the racial groups in this country are not geographically concentrated, but intermixed, unlike Iraq (CIA South Africa, 5).
Alternation of power, such as that in a majoritarian system, is also far less likely in a deeply divided society. It can lead to permanent exclusion of minority groups, or at least the perception that this is the case. This is a viable concern in both South Africa and Iraq. The ANC which is representative of black Africans, has won sizeable representational dominance in all three elections (1994, 1999,and 2004), with no probability that it will be challenged by another equally sized party any time soon. The Shiites have disproportionate representation in the executive branch and in parliament, leaving the Sunnis with barely any political sway. This can be deeply dangerous in terms of violence for Iraq, seeing that if Sunnis are banned from political negotiations, they will likely turn to violent opposition as a way to be heard. One Sunni assemblyman was quoted for saying that there will be “either unity, dignity and security or division and bloodshed,” showing that either the Sunnis will be included in politics fairly, or will become violent. (Morrow, 20). Meshaan Al Juburi, another fellow Sunni assemblyman, described the national government as “a government of the winners who have marginalized the Sunnis” (Harvard, 1208).
This is also dangerous in terms of policies that can be formed by the majority that are discriminate against the minority. This is especially worrisome in the Council of Representatives which oversees the Central Bank and the media. The potential for economic policies, or media propaganda to be shaped in a way to favor the Shiite majority, is a real threat. The effects of ANC dominance are already clearly seen in South Africa in terms of massive white emigration out of South Africa since 1994 when the ANC made Affirmative Action polices that restricted many economic and social opportunities for whites.
Revenue sharing is also a good tactic to encourage cooperation, since it gets rid of the incentive for a party to secede or not cooperate (Dawisha, 4). Revenue sharing in terms of oil revenue, may not be a good idea for Iraq though, and should stay in the hands of the central government. This is due to the fact that most of the oil is in the Shiite south, which according to the constitution should not matter since the revenues are to be shared, but may matter because there is no mutual threat to force sharing since the Shiites control most of the oil. If there was proportionate concentrations of oil in the Sunni center and the Kurdish north, there would be mutual threats such that revenue sharing would be induced, but with the Shiite region having most of the oil, this outcome may not happen.
Clearly the Sunnis are excluded from the constitution drafting, their voting from that point on is seen as tacit consent to a constitution they had no part in. When they abstained we acted like they were being terrorizing assholes, but in fact they had full justification not to vote. The simple act of voting can be seen as tacit consent to be governed (true, sufficient but not necessary). In addition, the people who rule them now can change the constitution at any time, in any way, with a majority. The Sunnis have absolutely no veto or say whatsoever. This democracy is severely flawed to say the least. We can expect nothing but violence until the Sunnis are given appropriate representation.
If we are touting democracy and a political voice as an alternative to terrorism, we can talk all the shit we want… but until we see power sharing in Iraq there will be widespread violence and civil war. expect nothing less. and stop talking shit about how wonderful their democracy is and how wrong Sparkie Arbuckle is. We are brought full circle to ‘The Truth’ (as ChiefRZ would say) again:
Works Cited
Harvard. “Democracy in Iraq.” Harvard Law Review. 119 (2005): 1201-1222.
Morrow, Jonathan. “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II.” United States Institute of Peace. November 2005. United States Institute of Peace. 25 April 2006.
CIA South Africa. 2 May 2006. The World Factbook. 3 May 2006.
CIA Iraq. 2 May 2006. The World Factbook. 3 May 2006.
Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
Dawisha, Adeed, and Karen Dawisha. “How To Build A Democratic Iraq.” Foreign Affairs. 82 (2003): 36-50.
Iraq Constitution. “Text of the Iraqi Constitution.” 15 April 2006.
Israeli, Raphael. The Iraq War. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004.
Phillips, David. Losing Iraq. Boulder: Westview Press, 2005
Rob said the following:
Of course, the government representatives elected by the people are all asking for the U.S. to stay.
and
The people of Iraq have their own sovereign government now.
and I replied
We left out the Sunnis. Anyone who knows anything about this stuff knows that a consociational or power-sharing government is the only option in an ethnically and religiously charged situation like Iraq. Its clear stability was not our goal when you take that into account.
See the original spat here. What I said is true. What we have over there IS technically a democracy, but the Sunni minority has been excluded and much of the recent political history there can quickly explain why we will continue to see lots of violence in this ‘democracy’ until the Sunnis are included and all the citizens can be represented not only in the government, but also in the constitution.
First, I was right and you three were all wrong. Now the substance:
Iraq gained independence from Britain in 1932, and was claimed a Republic in 1958, even though it was nothing more than a series of military strongmen, the latest who was Saddam Hussein (Israeli, 6). Saddam Hussein represented the Sunni Muslim minority, a population which constitutes only 32% compared to the 65% of the Shiite majority, or the 15-20% comprised of the Kurdish minority (CIA Iraq, 3). Saddam Hussein’s regime was dismantled, not due to preventive negotiations like South Africa, but because the United States ousted Hussein’s regime over acclaimed non-compliance with the United Nations Security Council (Israeli, 7).
Following this, a Constitutional Drafting Committee was formed, and it was expected that they would finish the constitutional draft in time for the referendum on October 15, 2005( Morrow, 9). Unfortunately, in August, the Committee was scrapped and a Leadership Council was formed with the Sunni representatives excluded from the negotiations. The draft was completed by the projected due date, and was put up to a national referendum on October 15, just as planned. The most contentious issues regarding issues like women’s rights, or how much power the regions should have, were left out of the negotiations (Phillips, 156). The draft would be nullified if two-thirds of three provinces voted against it becoming the permanent constitution (Harvard, 1205). So the Sunnis were excluded from the drafting of the constitution and then the majority (again excluding the Sunnis) voted it in.
As one might expect following Sunni exclusion from the Constitutional negotiations, the three provinces that heavily voted against it were Sunni dominated (1206). Two of the provinces, Salahudain and Anbar, voted 82% and 97% respectively against it. The third province, Ninevan, had a 55% vote against passing the draft, just barely missing the three provinces, two-third majority requirement. Even though this requirement was barely missed, Sunni opposition to the new constitutional framework was already beginning to show.
On December 15, 2005, the first parliamentary elections were held for the National Assembly. 128 seats out of 275 were won by the Shiites, the Sunnis took 44 and the Kurds 53 seats. The final constitutional framework that was passed, set up the institution of the legislature as divided into the Council of Representatives and the Council of Unions (Iraq Constitution 9-12). The Council of Representatives is elected by proportional representation for a four year term, and has the responsibility of electing the President, Prime Minister and Deputy President, by an absolute majority vote. Decisions on passing legislation are also made by the Council of Representatives, and only a simple majority vote is required. The Council of Unions is made up of representatives from the 18 provinces, and is responsible for looking over legislation that is directly pertinent to the provinces, but they have no veto power to stop legislation from passing (13). The Iraqi Central Bank, Financial Inspection Office, and the Media and Communications Agency are all responsible directly to the Council of Representatives (17).
The Iraq Constitution also mandates revenue sharing of all future profits made from oil, since oil and gas, under the new constitution, is seen as the property of all the Iraqi people (19). Revenues are to be distributed fairly all over the country. Each province is to have their own President and National Council, which are to be directly elected, but in reality, the total amount of power each province has amounts to basically nothing more than jurisdiction over their police forces. Iraq’s Constitution calls for a majoritarian system for passing legislation and electing a President, which will have dire consequences on the minority population of the Sunnis. Saddam’s disposal gave the political actors the opportunity to implement institutions and form a constitutional framework that would work towards cooperation and representation of all groups, but instead reverse marginalization has taken place through both of their majoritarian systems and policies. Majoritarianism can lead to increased conflict in deeply divided societies, [like Iraq], since certain groups may find themselves disadvantaged in terms of resources, or have policies imposed on them against their will. Majoritarian systems are okay for homogenous societies [like the U.S.], but majoritarianism is likely to exacerbate divisions in heterogeneous societies, and can even lead to civil war or secession. A positive future for the world’s most deeply divided societies can be achieved only by some variation of power sharing (241). Consociational democracy is the sort of democracy this country needs to adopt if there is to ever be cooperation and peace.
There are four main characteristics that are vital towards implementing consociational democracy. First, executive power should be shared amongst the representatives of all major groups. Second, there should be a high degree of segmental autonomy for those groups who want it. Third, there should be proportional representation in government and the civil service, and fourth, each group should have a minority veto over the most vital issues. Robert Dahl, a supporter of consociational democracy, advises that there needs to be mutual security for cooperation to happen (Dahl, 118). Consociational democracy provides mutual security and minority protection. Some academics worry that consociational democracy may lead to deadlock since each group has a minority veto. This may be the case, but for many deeply divided societies, especially like Iraq, the alternative to a situation of deadlock is civil war. Also, the minority veto is a mutual veto and because of this it will be used conservatively since each segment understands that if it does not use it in such a way, opposing segments will block their legislation next time.
Iraq needs to adopt three of the requirements. It already has proportional representation in government, but lacks it in civil service. Proportional representation is not enough to guarantee representation when one group has more than 50% of the population (158). Proportional representation may make minority inclusion more likely, but it does not guarantee it. South Africa, for example, does have a veto for the legislation that is pertinent to regions, but unfortunately the racial groups in this country are not geographically concentrated, but intermixed, unlike Iraq (CIA South Africa, 5).
Alternation of power, such as that in a majoritarian system, is also far less likely in a deeply divided society. It can lead to permanent exclusion of minority groups, or at least the perception that this is the case. This is a viable concern in both South Africa and Iraq. The ANC which is representative of black Africans, has won sizeable representational dominance in all three elections (1994, 1999,and 2004), with no probability that it will be challenged by another equally sized party any time soon. The Shiites have disproportionate representation in the executive branch and in parliament, leaving the Sunnis with barely any political sway. This can be deeply dangerous in terms of violence for Iraq, seeing that if Sunnis are banned from political negotiations, they will likely turn to violent opposition as a way to be heard. One Sunni assemblyman was quoted for saying that there will be “either unity, dignity and security or division and bloodshed,” showing that either the Sunnis will be included in politics fairly, or will become violent. (Morrow, 20). Meshaan Al Juburi, another fellow Sunni assemblyman, described the national government as “a government of the winners who have marginalized the Sunnis” (Harvard, 1208).
This is also dangerous in terms of policies that can be formed by the majority that are discriminate against the minority. This is especially worrisome in the Council of Representatives which oversees the Central Bank and the media. The potential for economic policies, or media propaganda to be shaped in a way to favor the Shiite majority, is a real threat. The effects of ANC dominance are already clearly seen in South Africa in terms of massive white emigration out of South Africa since 1994 when the ANC made Affirmative Action polices that restricted many economic and social opportunities for whites.
Revenue sharing is also a good tactic to encourage cooperation, since it gets rid of the incentive for a party to secede or not cooperate (Dawisha, 4). Revenue sharing in terms of oil revenue, may not be a good idea for Iraq though, and should stay in the hands of the central government. This is due to the fact that most of the oil is in the Shiite south, which according to the constitution should not matter since the revenues are to be shared, but may matter because there is no mutual threat to force sharing since the Shiites control most of the oil. If there was proportionate concentrations of oil in the Sunni center and the Kurdish north, there would be mutual threats such that revenue sharing would be induced, but with the Shiite region having most of the oil, this outcome may not happen.
Clearly the Sunnis are excluded from the constitution drafting, their voting from that point on is seen as tacit consent to a constitution they had no part in. When they abstained we acted like they were being terrorizing assholes, but in fact they had full justification not to vote. The simple act of voting can be seen as tacit consent to be governed (true, sufficient but not necessary). In addition, the people who rule them now can change the constitution at any time, in any way, with a majority. The Sunnis have absolutely no veto or say whatsoever. This democracy is severely flawed to say the least. We can expect nothing but violence until the Sunnis are given appropriate representation.
If we are touting democracy and a political voice as an alternative to terrorism, we can talk all the shit we want… but until we see power sharing in Iraq there will be widespread violence and civil war. expect nothing less. and stop talking shit about how wonderful their democracy is and how wrong Sparkie Arbuckle is. We are brought full circle to ‘The Truth’ (as ChiefRZ would say) again:
We left out the Sunnis. Anyone who knows anything about this stuff knows that a consociational or power-sharing government is the only option in an ethnically and religiously charged situation like Iraq. Its clear stability was not our goal when you take that into account.
Works Cited
Harvard. “Democracy in Iraq.” Harvard Law Review. 119 (2005): 1201-1222.
Morrow, Jonathan. “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II.” United States Institute of Peace. November 2005. United States Institute of Peace. 25 April 2006.
CIA South Africa. 2 May 2006. The World Factbook. 3 May 2006
CIA Iraq. 2 May 2006. The World Factbook. 3 May 2006
Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
Dawisha, Adeed, and Karen Dawisha. “How To Build A Democratic Iraq.” Foreign Affairs. 82 (2003): 36-50.
Iraq Constitution. “Text of the Iraqi Constitution.” 15 April 2006.
Israeli, Raphael. The Iraq War. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004.
Phillips, David. Losing Iraq. Boulder: Westview Press, 2005
