Sparkie’s Thoughts on the Main Institutions of I.R. and the Preservation of the States System
In international relations today the most powerful institution is balance of power (BOP). International law (IL) and diplomacy (D) have taken a back seat to the continual making and remaking of economic and political alliances to resist the dominant powers. BOP prevents weak states from being conquered or plundered by the strong (Brown 244). BOP’s goal is to allow states to survive and prevent the transformation of the global states system into an empire. This is similar to the goals of D and IL, institutions that also influence behavior between states, but D and IL are only able to become more influential in international relations when the most powerful states consent to IL, choose to engage in D, or are forced by a balance of power to recognize IL or to partake in D. Today, because powerful countries do not consent to IL or choose to engage in D, BOP is the default institution of international relations that keeps the most powerful countries in check and preserves the state system.
The BOP within the states system is an institution or set of norms and structures and not a specific administration – it is based on, and results from, the assumption that international law has no final global authority. BOP must be objective; it must actually exist, in addition to being subjective, or being perceived as existing by the people (Bull 99). A simple BOP between two states requires that the two states be fairly evenly matched in power, while a complex BOP can involve many inequities in power. Multiple lesser states can align to balance out a disproportionately large, powerful state – complex BOP is seen as being more stable than a simple two state BOP (98). When BOP is an institution used in international relations, it can allow D and IL to develop and gain power in the global states system. BOP can be seen as a default means to preserve the global states system when D and IL have failed. While peace might be a goal of IL or D, BOP’s goal is not peace as war is often required to maintain BOP. Naturally, BOP tends to operate in the favor of the great powers because preponderant states are not restricted from violating the rights of other states by IL or D (99-104). During the cold war there was a simple BOP between the U.S. and Russia – mutual nuclear deterrence, space exploration, propaganda, alliances, and intelligence served to balance out the two superpowers. In the current world states system there is a complex, contrived BOP - the U.S. is clearly the world superpower and it is balanced by economic and political networks that join the power of many, less powerful states together in a variety of alliances. Some of the lesser states, without IL to protect or preserve their status, must use diplomacy with other states and make calculated economic and political alliances in order to buttress themselves against the influence of superpowers like the U.S. - Power within the states system used to be influenced by things like army size, population, and territory; but now greater power is accorded to nuclear power, intelligence power, the centers of capital accumulation, and those who control desired natural resources such as petroleum (Smith 300). Countries like Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia are islands of exception to the rules of markets and trade sweeping the world. In this way capitalism and market fundamentalism have their own, well-funded opposition and a balance of power occurs, joining unlikely allies to balance out the concentrations of money and power that result from free-market economics (Washigton Post Nov. 20, 2006). As countries like China and the U.S. increase in power and consumption, the countries that provide raw materials and energy also experience an increase in power that can enable them to protect themselves and others – in addition their power is balanced against the larger powers since good relations must be maintained for successful economic trade.
If one looks at the recent Iraq conflict one can see that the U.S. was not inhibited by any IL and rejected D because Saddam was unwilling to surrender certain autonomies. The U.S. was preponderant and it occupied Iraq and installed a majority government. The current U.S. administration has also voiced displeasure with states like Iran and Syria yet, because of Iran and Syria’s alliances elsewhere, many countries have voiced strong disapproval of further US meddling in the Middle East. If one looks back only to 1989, one finds the U.S. administration tolerating Saddam’s human rights abuses, which arguably violated IL, in exchange for stability and economic relations. Although we have entirely reversed our feelings about Saddam at this point, the U.S. still favors BOP over IL as the predominant institution in international relations.
International law (IL) exists as an institution of international relations that Bentham believed exists between states but not above them as there is no leviathan. IL would apply to states and other non-state actors, but some, like the Austinian view, contend that there is no IL. The Austinian view holds there is only international morality, because there is no enforcement of IL. Hobbes believes that where there is no common power, there is no international law (Bull 124). IL’s ability to counter the material base of power and interest is limited (Smith 446). Even without enforceability, IL can work if the most powerful states recognize IL and consent to be regulated by it. Often it may become difficult to enforce IL if the most powerful state is in violation. One criticism of BOP is that it is at odds with IL – it relies on mutual deterrence, war, and alliances in order to maintain the states system. BOP might rationalize a war, one that would otherwise be against international law, if it is preventing a certain state from becoming too powerful. Perhaps the state’s increase in power will be victimless and won’t involve territorial or sovereignty violations – even though the state would be protected under IL theory, it is vulnerable to war in a BOP scenario. Despite being at odds with IL, BOP also is needed to maintain IL (Bull 104). If the powers are not balanced among the states, if there isn’t ‘common power’, there is little incentive for some states to acknowledge or abide by IL (Bull 107).
Today one can see that there are many examples of un-enforced violations of IL. Powerful states are able to tolerate violations of IL from some states if there are economic or political incentives to do so. Examples of U.S. allies whose human rights violations have been tolerated by the U.S. would include: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, and many others (Smith 301). States and citizens who should be protected by IL often are not for a variety of reasons. Examples of this would include the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, human rights abuses in China, the current genocide in Sudan, and Israel’s conduct in the Lebanon conflict. Sudan and Rwanda both hold little power and are of little economic or strategic benefit to the more powerful countries. In contrast, Israel and China are powerful and are protected by other powerful states so their abuses become difficult to enforce.
Bull defines diplomacy as a system of communication or negotiation; it manages international relations through political actors communicating and exchanging information. Inherent in D is a certain protocol to be observed, and D can serve to eliminate friction in international relations. D also helps preserve the global states system by acknowledging the existence of each state. It symbolizes the existence of a society of states, and in this way it can help facilitate the emergence of IL (Bull 164). Unfortunately, like IL, D is only plausible when there is a fairly even balance of power. If there is nothing to negotiate with or if the negotiation is not between even parties, the more powerful party has little incentive to participate in the negotiations.
Diplomatic institutions have declined in the last century (Bull 171). This is evidenced today in the U.S.’s failure to talk to states like Iran or Syria in a fair, diplomatic manner unless it serves their interests. We may begin to bring Syria and Iran into the Iraq diplomacy in order to maintain a regional BOP in the Iraq area and to prevent a civil war and help increase security. If the U.S. did not have a selfish incentive for being diplomatic with Syria and Iran they probably would not engage them diplomatically. Before the US had selfish reasons for D, it engaged in political warfare. This would be characterized as diplomacy by insult and is a normal feature of periods of low consensus in the international society (168). Hopefully, with the further economic growth of weaker states, the U.S. will be held accountable for upholding and using all three of the institutions - BOP, D, and IL all the time and not when it is just convenient for achieving a goal in our national interest.
Works Cited
Brown, Chris, et al. International Relations in Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Bull, Hedley. Anarchical Society .New York City: Columbia University Press, 1977.
Smith, M, et al. Perspectives on World Politics. Oxford: Routledge Press, 2005.
Zakaria, Fareed. “It is the Economy Mr. President.” Washington Post. 20 November 2006: 1
The BOP within the states system is an institution or set of norms and structures and not a specific administration – it is based on, and results from, the assumption that international law has no final global authority. BOP must be objective; it must actually exist, in addition to being subjective, or being perceived as existing by the people (Bull 99). A simple BOP between two states requires that the two states be fairly evenly matched in power, while a complex BOP can involve many inequities in power. Multiple lesser states can align to balance out a disproportionately large, powerful state – complex BOP is seen as being more stable than a simple two state BOP (98). When BOP is an institution used in international relations, it can allow D and IL to develop and gain power in the global states system. BOP can be seen as a default means to preserve the global states system when D and IL have failed. While peace might be a goal of IL or D, BOP’s goal is not peace as war is often required to maintain BOP. Naturally, BOP tends to operate in the favor of the great powers because preponderant states are not restricted from violating the rights of other states by IL or D (99-104). During the cold war there was a simple BOP between the U.S. and Russia – mutual nuclear deterrence, space exploration, propaganda, alliances, and intelligence served to balance out the two superpowers. In the current world states system there is a complex, contrived BOP - the U.S. is clearly the world superpower and it is balanced by economic and political networks that join the power of many, less powerful states together in a variety of alliances. Some of the lesser states, without IL to protect or preserve their status, must use diplomacy with other states and make calculated economic and political alliances in order to buttress themselves against the influence of superpowers like the U.S. - Power within the states system used to be influenced by things like army size, population, and territory; but now greater power is accorded to nuclear power, intelligence power, the centers of capital accumulation, and those who control desired natural resources such as petroleum (Smith 300). Countries like Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia are islands of exception to the rules of markets and trade sweeping the world. In this way capitalism and market fundamentalism have their own, well-funded opposition and a balance of power occurs, joining unlikely allies to balance out the concentrations of money and power that result from free-market economics (Washigton Post Nov. 20, 2006). As countries like China and the U.S. increase in power and consumption, the countries that provide raw materials and energy also experience an increase in power that can enable them to protect themselves and others – in addition their power is balanced against the larger powers since good relations must be maintained for successful economic trade.
If one looks at the recent Iraq conflict one can see that the U.S. was not inhibited by any IL and rejected D because Saddam was unwilling to surrender certain autonomies. The U.S. was preponderant and it occupied Iraq and installed a majority government. The current U.S. administration has also voiced displeasure with states like Iran and Syria yet, because of Iran and Syria’s alliances elsewhere, many countries have voiced strong disapproval of further US meddling in the Middle East. If one looks back only to 1989, one finds the U.S. administration tolerating Saddam’s human rights abuses, which arguably violated IL, in exchange for stability and economic relations. Although we have entirely reversed our feelings about Saddam at this point, the U.S. still favors BOP over IL as the predominant institution in international relations.
International law (IL) exists as an institution of international relations that Bentham believed exists between states but not above them as there is no leviathan. IL would apply to states and other non-state actors, but some, like the Austinian view, contend that there is no IL. The Austinian view holds there is only international morality, because there is no enforcement of IL. Hobbes believes that where there is no common power, there is no international law (Bull 124). IL’s ability to counter the material base of power and interest is limited (Smith 446). Even without enforceability, IL can work if the most powerful states recognize IL and consent to be regulated by it. Often it may become difficult to enforce IL if the most powerful state is in violation. One criticism of BOP is that it is at odds with IL – it relies on mutual deterrence, war, and alliances in order to maintain the states system. BOP might rationalize a war, one that would otherwise be against international law, if it is preventing a certain state from becoming too powerful. Perhaps the state’s increase in power will be victimless and won’t involve territorial or sovereignty violations – even though the state would be protected under IL theory, it is vulnerable to war in a BOP scenario. Despite being at odds with IL, BOP also is needed to maintain IL (Bull 104). If the powers are not balanced among the states, if there isn’t ‘common power’, there is little incentive for some states to acknowledge or abide by IL (Bull 107).
Today one can see that there are many examples of un-enforced violations of IL. Powerful states are able to tolerate violations of IL from some states if there are economic or political incentives to do so. Examples of U.S. allies whose human rights violations have been tolerated by the U.S. would include: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, and many others (Smith 301). States and citizens who should be protected by IL often are not for a variety of reasons. Examples of this would include the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, human rights abuses in China, the current genocide in Sudan, and Israel’s conduct in the Lebanon conflict. Sudan and Rwanda both hold little power and are of little economic or strategic benefit to the more powerful countries. In contrast, Israel and China are powerful and are protected by other powerful states so their abuses become difficult to enforce.
Bull defines diplomacy as a system of communication or negotiation; it manages international relations through political actors communicating and exchanging information. Inherent in D is a certain protocol to be observed, and D can serve to eliminate friction in international relations. D also helps preserve the global states system by acknowledging the existence of each state. It symbolizes the existence of a society of states, and in this way it can help facilitate the emergence of IL (Bull 164). Unfortunately, like IL, D is only plausible when there is a fairly even balance of power. If there is nothing to negotiate with or if the negotiation is not between even parties, the more powerful party has little incentive to participate in the negotiations.
Diplomatic institutions have declined in the last century (Bull 171). This is evidenced today in the U.S.’s failure to talk to states like Iran or Syria in a fair, diplomatic manner unless it serves their interests. We may begin to bring Syria and Iran into the Iraq diplomacy in order to maintain a regional BOP in the Iraq area and to prevent a civil war and help increase security. If the U.S. did not have a selfish incentive for being diplomatic with Syria and Iran they probably would not engage them diplomatically. Before the US had selfish reasons for D, it engaged in political warfare. This would be characterized as diplomacy by insult and is a normal feature of periods of low consensus in the international society (168). Hopefully, with the further economic growth of weaker states, the U.S. will be held accountable for upholding and using all three of the institutions - BOP, D, and IL all the time and not when it is just convenient for achieving a goal in our national interest.
Works Cited
Brown, Chris, et al. International Relations in Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Bull, Hedley. Anarchical Society .New York City: Columbia University Press, 1977.
Smith, M, et al. Perspectives on World Politics. Oxford: Routledge Press, 2005.
Zakaria, Fareed. “It is the Economy Mr. President.” Washington Post. 20 November 2006: 1
. But Sparkie had something to say earlier about IL…
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