Nozick and the Minimal State
Concurrently posted at The Arbuckle Institute.
This one is quite a read. It was brought about by an argument or two with some lib friends about the morality of any state. It is consistent with Knee-high-man’s accusation that I am merely a ‘shit disturbing anarchist’ (
), however I do believe in the need for the minimal state. In what follows I merely prove that there is no moral transition from the state of nature to the minimal state. In addition, I grant Nozick and the ‘individualist anarchists’ certain natural rights which there may or may not be issues with. The girl (brilliant and beautiful without equal), as always, helped at various junctures. Enjoy. I couldn’t figure out how to do footnotes, so I have included the footnotes in the *X* format. They can all be found at the end of the piece, ‘below the fold’. Also, let me add, that I am grateful for the audience. These extended posts are sweet for keeping my research and theory skills up while I’m on hiatus from more formal studies.
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The libertarian Nozick *1*, in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia, sets out to demonstrate that only a minimal state *2*, and nothing more extensive, can be morally justified (Miller 10). In response to Locke’s arguments against anarchy, Nozick feels that Locke dismissed the anarchist position too quickly and gives it a more thorough analysis (Wolff 42). The first part of Nozick’s book is geared toward the individualist anarchists, and he spends this portion of the book answering their moral objections to a state. Individual anarchists, such as Benjamin Tucker (who Nozick names), start with the same premise as Nozick, namely that individuals have inviolable rights to life, liberty, and property (16). Since both the individualist anarchists and Nozick share this theoretical ground, he finds himself obligated to answer their objections against the state. Nozick puts forth a theory that purports to show that the minimal state can arise from an ideal form of the state of nature by morally permissible means, and claims that it does so by not violating the natural rights of life, liberty, and property that Nozick believes all individuals have (later in his theory he adds the natural rights of self-defense and punishment) (Nozick 10). Nozick’s view on rights takes the form of Lockean natural rights that are negative in form, meaning that they act as moral side constraints on other’s actions towards you, rather than positive rights that are obligations others owe you. Nozick believes natural rights to be absolute and inviolable since each person’s life is separate and no one individual or his rights may be sacrificed for other considerations *3*. Nozick adopts the Kantian categorical imperative in his view of what individuals may rightfully do to one another. The Kantian view holds that people may only be treated as ends and not only as means since they are capable of having a life that is meaningful *4* (50). After introducing his view on natural rights, Nozick adds that all individuals have the non-natural and non-absolute right to a reliable procedure of justice (Wolff 63).
The individualist anarchists put forth two main moral objections to the formation of a state. Nozick takes these objections seriously, since both share the same premise that individuals have rights that are inviolable. Nozick aims to show that a minimal state can arise from the state of nature and preserve the individual’s inviolable rights each step of the way. It is his hope that he can answer the individual anarchist’s objections with his theory of the minimal state. The first of the individual anarchists’ objections concerns the state’s monopoly on the use of force (Nozick 51). When a state monopolizes the use of force within a geographical territory, the individual anarchists claim that it does so by punishing those who wish to defend their own rights by allowing the state to protect and enforce rights on their behalf. In the individual anarchists’ view, this is immoral since it violates the absolute right an individual has to self-defense and hence, the state is rights-violating and immoral. The second objection the individual anarchists’ put forth concerns the immoral forceful redistribution of property done by the state. When a state holds a monopoly over the use of force, and some individuals do not voluntarily allow the state to protect its rights, the state must somehow include them within its sphere of protection. Through the inclusion of the “independents”, whom would rather self-enforce their right to self-defense, the other individuals who voluntarily allowed the state to protect its rights must now pay for the protection of these “independents” by the state. The anarchists hold that the state has violated the right to property all individuals have when it forcefully makes the individuals, already within the state, pay for the “independents’” protection. Therefore, the individual anarchists conclude, the state is immoral and cannot be justified. Nozick now has the burden, in his defense of the minimal state, to first show that the dominant protection agency (to be explained later in this paper) is justified in protecting “independents” who want to defend their own rights (Paul 68). Second, Nozick must show the anarchists that forceful redistribution does not take place, but rather that it is an act of compensation as morally required by the principle of compensation. Unfortunately, Nozick fails to satisfactorily answer both objections, and due to his strict moral framework of inviolable rights, he is unable to make the theoretical moves he attempts to make while at the same time proving that the minimal state arises by a rights-preserving process. The individual anarchists’ complaints, in the end, are left unanswered and Nozick’s minimal state, by way of his and the individual anarchists’ own requirements, is left unjustified and proves to be immoral. Nozick’s theory of how the minimal state arises can be broken down into four parts. Nozick first looks at how the state of nature transitions to a mutual protection agency, second, how the minimal protection agency transitions to a dominant protection agency, third, Nozick shows the transition from the dominant protection agency to the ultraminimal state, and finally, Nozick moves from the ultraminimal state to the minimal state. Nozick, in his theory, uses Weber’s definition of a state (Nozick 37). Weber’s two criteria for a state include one, that there is a monopoly on the use of force in a geographical area and two, that it protects all individual’s rights within its geographical territory. Using these two criteria, Nozick sets out to show how the state, containing both of these criteria, can be rights-preserving and moral therefore, answering the individual anarchists’ two main moral objections to a state.
Starting from the state of nature Nozick informs the reader, especially his main target audience, the individual anarchists, that he will use an ideal form of the state of nature, one in which rights violations are the exception and not the norm, in order to show that the minimal state is an improvement on the state of nature (Nozick 55). Within the state of nature individuals have the natural rights to life (bodily integrity), liberty, to acquire property, as well as self-defense, and the right to punish others for rights-violations (Miller 12). Individuals are also able to transfer or exchange their rights with others who consent to the transfer. In order to better protect their rights, Nozick argues that individuals may band together to form mutual protection associations (Nozick 10). The group that is formed, Nozick points out, only has the rights individuals transfer to it ( i.e. to the other individuals in the group who are allowed to enforce them on the individual’s behalf), and no group has any special right above and beyond those transferred to it. Over time, individuals will realize that there are many inconveniences that come from the mutual protection agency such as individuals always being on call to serve their protective duties when one member purports that their rights were violated. Generally, Nozick argues, mutual protection associations will act in a correct manner since members will not want to waste time on false complaints of rights-violations.
The inconveniences of the mutual protection associations will, in the end, lead to a division of labor where entrepreneurs set up businesses to sell protective services (Wolff 44). The individuals who wish to avoid the inconveniences and risk of always being on call within the mutual protection agency, will chose to buy their protective services since this would be the rational thing to do *5*. Later, the protection agencies will find it in their interest to merge with one another since instead of constantly doing battle with one another, and they will be able to internally arbitrate the cases the more clients it has belonging to it, or only deal with issues concerning their clients and “independents”. The individuals, Nozick argues, will want to join the largest protection agency since they are rational and will find that the largest protection agency will better protect and enforce their rights against non-clients (Nozick 54). The protection agency at this point has now become the dominant protection agency in a certain geographical territory. David Miller, has put forth an objection to Nozick’s claim that rational individuals are bound to join the largest protection agency of an area (Miller 12). If the smaller agencies are more efficient, Miller argues, and are better able to enforce the client’s rights since they are smaller, then how can Nozick assume that the largest agency will have the comparative advantage? While this objection is important, it will be assumed that Nozick is correct to give him as much theoretical charity as possible.
At this point in Nozick’s theory there is a dominant protection agency, yet there are individual’s within the territory that he calls “independents” who insist on protecting and enforcing their own rights. The individual anarchist will correctly point out, that at this point the dominant protection agency and the “independents” may come into conflict as to what is the proper method for dealing with complaints of rights violations. The dominant protection agency will surely have its favored procedures for justice that it deems fair and reliable and possibly the “independents” will have theirs. So whose procedure of justice is correct? This stage of Nozick’s argument is crucial since it is at this point that he purports to answer satisfactorily the individual anarchists’ first objection and show that the dominant protection agency can justifiably hold a monopoly over rights-enforcement and punishment in the area. Nozick now has the burden to prove that the dominant protective agency can justifiably prohibit the “independents” from taking action against its clients (Miller 13). To protect its clients against the risks of the “independents,” or as Wolff calls them, the ‘John Wayne types’, Nozick argues that the dominant protection agency is justified in prohibiting the John Waynes from using unreliable procedures of justice *6*, since all individuals have the non-natural right to have a reliable procedure of justice used on them (Wolff 63). Nozick believes that the dominant protection agency will publish a list of objectively reliable procedures of justice that individuals are allowed to use against its clients (Nozick 102). If it finds an “independent” using an unapproved procedure they will be prohibited from doing so since they have “the muscle to do this”, and will ultimately prohibit their absolute right of self-defense in such cases *7*. It is now at this point that the dominant protection agency, Nozick states, has transitioned to an ultraminimal state due to the fact that it has satisfied the first condition of Weber’s definition of a state (having a monopoly of force in an area). The ultraminimal state has a de facto monopoly, not in the sense that it alone enforces rights, but in the sense that it alone decides which procedures are reliable and fair (Mack and Gaus 120).
Nozick believes he has shown the ultraminimal state to arise in a rights-preserving way since, he argues, the ultraminimal state has the power to prohibit “independents”, non-clients of the dominant protective agency, from using unreliable procedures against its clients. Nozick claims that it violates no one’s rights since it prohibits individuals from using unreliable procedures that it classifies as “risky behavior,” and furthermore, can be prohibited since it violates a client’s rights to a reliable procedure of justice. Nozick concludes that he has shown the individual anarchists that it is not an unjust imposition of a de facto monopoly since it arises by an invisible hand process *8*, uses morally permissible means, does not violate anyone’s rights, and does so without claims to a special right above those that have been transferred to it by its members (Nozick 114-115).
Unfortunately, Nozick has failed to satisfactorily answer the individual anarchist’s first objection. An individual’s right to have a reliable procedure of justice used on them is not a natural right like the other rights Nozick presents (right to life, liberty, self-defense, and punishment), and is only justified by Nozick on the basis that an unreliable procedure may produce fear if it is used (Nozick 105, 114-115 and Wolff 63). Therefore, it seems that Nozick is constraining the absolute right of self-defense with the non-absolute right of a reliable procedure. For example, let us imagine that the “independent” believes, and has objectively *9* had his natural right to property violated by a client. Whether he is correct or wrong it does not matter since he has an absolute right to self-defense. Let us suppose that the “independent” uses an objectively unreliable procedure against the client to find out if the client is guilty, and the dominant protection agency reacts in self-defense on behalf of its client to resist the objectively unreliable procedure as Nozick says it may (on behalf of the client). One may then ask which use of self-defense is correct? If self-defense is an absolute right, which it is under Nozick’s view, then both seem to be correct in using it. Nozick states that even if the client is guilty, the dominant protection agency can act in self-defense against the unreliable procedure and prohibit its use (Nozick 108). It would be arbitrary to choose one use of self-defense as correct over the other since both have an absolute right to self-defense, and their ability to use their right to self-defense does not bear on whether the client is guilty or not. Nozick wants to say that the client has a right to have a reliable procedure used on him. A clash of rights takes place (both the dominant protection agency, acting on behalf of its client and self-defending against the procedure, and the independent have the right to use their absolute right to self-defense), yet Nozick sides with constraining the “independent’s” right to self-defense, no matter if the client is guilty or not, since John Wayne used an unreliable procedure. Nozick assumes the right to a reliable procedure of justice, and does not ground it in the natural rights foundation (Wolff 63). If anything, the individual anarchists would say to thwart the non-absolute right to a fair procedure since it is the only one that can be violated seeing that it is a non-natural right. Theorists such as Wolff suggest that it would be conducive to Nozick’s defense if he grounded the right to a fair procedure in the natural and absolute right of liberty, but Nozick, in the end, does not. If self-defense can be thwarted by a non-absolute right (the right to a reliable procedure of justice), which is the case in Nozick’s theory, Nozick has failed to show that the ultraminimal state has arisen by a non-rights violating manner (Wolff 72). It is not consistent with Nozick’s theory to choose one use of self-defense as correct over the other just because the client’s non-absolute right to a reliable procedure has been violated . Therefore, the individual anarchist will reject Nozick’s answer to their first objection.
The individual anarchists can bring up another problem with Nozick’s theory. How can the dominant protection agency be sure that they know which procedures are objectively reliable? If for example, the dominant protection agency only believes to be using a correct procedure, and the “independent”, in contrast, uses a procedure that can be, for the sake of argument, objectively verified as correct, then this is another case of rights-violation (Wolff 72). By having the dominant protection agency prohibit the objectively correct procedure used by the “independent”, it is violating the “independent’s” right to self-defense and also is violating the right all individuals have to a reliable procedure since the procedure the dominant protection agency approves of is objectively wrong even though, for the sake of argument, they believe it to be correct (Miller 19). Overall, the individual anarchists will conclude that Nozick has failed to show how “independents” can be prohibited from enforcing their right to self-defense. The only way for Nozick to answer this objection is to assume that the objectively reliable procedures can be known, and that the dominant protection agency uses them.
Nozick must also assume that all the “independents” used objectively unreliable procedures . If for instance, all the “independents” complied with the list of procedures the dominant protection agency produced, but simply had non-monetary reasons for remaining “independents” (meaning they could afford protective services but chose not to buy them) then there would be no way for the dominant protection agency to include them under their sphere of protection. Either Nozick must assume that all “independents” used unreliable procedures which is far fetched, or his theory is prevented at this point from going forward, or they must forcibly be included in order for a state to arise which would violate their natural right to self-defense, and liberty.
In order to give Nozick as much theoretical charity as possible, we will continue with his theory. Nozick claims that the ultraminimal state is morally required, by the principle of compensation, to compensate for any disadvantages the “independent” suffers by not being able to defend himself since he was prohibited from doing so by the dominant protection agency who felt his procedure to be too “risky”. Nozick argues that the compensation must be in the form of protective services if the “independent” cannot afford them, minus any costs the “independent” would have incurred if he were to have been able to self-defend (Nozick 111). By including the “independent(s)” under its protective sphere, Nozick claims that the ultraminimal state has transformed to a minimal state since it satisfies the second condition; it protects all people within its territory. Nozick claims to have answered the individual anarchists’ second objection since the ultraminimal state did not forcefully redistribute property to pay for the “independent’s” protective services, but merely compensated the “independent” as it is morally required to do so. Therefore, Nozick claims, he has shown how the minimal state can arise by an invisible hand process as well as by morally permissible means.
Nozick, as with the first individualist anarchist’s objection, has failed to answer satisfactory the second worry of the anarchists’ that what Nozick calls compensation is really redistribution. Nozick admits that he never justifies the principle of compensation, and more importantly is only a morally required procedure so therefore, it cannot be enforced (Nozick 110-111). The problem with this is the fact that Nozick has differentiated between what you are morally required to do and what the state can morally force you to do (Wolff 23). In this case, the ultraminimal state cannot force the client to pay compensation since this would violate their absolute right to property, and can only hope their clients act morally. Nozick has to assume that all of the clients within the ultraminimal state realize the moral requirement to pay compensation and, furthermore, act upon their realization, instead of either not realizing and acting upon it, or seeing it as forced redistribution (Wolff 67). This poses a problem for Nozick since he has to make a large assumption as to the behavior and beliefs of clients since the principle of compensation is only morally correct yet non-enforceable. Without such large assumptions, Nozick’s theory fails to satisfactorily answer the anarchist’s second objection.
Another problem with Nozick’s reasoning is that Nozick himself states that the compensation must be deemed satisfactory by the individual who is being compensated (Lacey 63 and Nozick 55). The compensation Nozick offers is only to those who cannot afford protective services, yet this seems fallacious. There may be “independents” who decided not to join the ultraminimal state for reasons other then monetary inability. Furthermore, Nozick later contradicts his statement that the clients are morally required to compensate the “independent” due to him being prohibited from using his absolute right to self defend (Nozick 78-79). While this has earlier been shown to pose a problem, there is a second problem, namely that Nozick contradicts the reason he gave earlier in the book for when compensation is required by later saying that only those who cannot afford the services will be compensated (i.e. given protective services for free or at a reduced price) (111). If the “independents” are disadvantaged by not being allowed to use their absolute right, then the anarchists would surely find it fallacious that Nozick wishes to compensate only those who can afford the ultraminimal state’s protection with services they had already rejected. Furthermore, Nozick tries to distract the individual anarchists with talk of compensation when they would object to Nozick’s claim that one can violate absolute right by thwarting it with a non-absolute right and then trying to compensate for it with protective services the ‘John Wayne types’ don’t even want (expect for those who were precluded from joining only on the basis of monetary inability).
Ultimately, Nozick makes assumptions and commits rights violations that the individual anarchist would not allow. Nozick leaves both of the anarchist objections unanswered, and has failed to properly show how the minimal state could arise with morally permissible steps. The assumptions he makes about what the individual’s beliefs and actions will be within his theory, do not have a strong enough basis to answer the anarchist’s objections. Furthermore, the strict moral foundation Nozick rests his theory on precludes him from looking to ways of violating them in a proper or allowable manner. No matter what type of compensation or other constraining rights Nozick brings to the table, the individual anarchist will surely object.
Footnotes:
1-Nozick is a deontologist since he believes that rights must be adhered to no matter what the consequences are. He also takes a consequentialist stance, which justifies an act by its consequence, when he states that a minimal state will be an improvement on the state of nature (Lacey 22, 71).
2-A minimal state, or as Nozick calls it a ‘night watchman state’ would simply be a police force, an army, and law courts and nothing more (Wolff 36, Nozick 25).
3-Other considerations may include utilitarian rights where one’s rights can be violated if considerations of maximum happiness come into play etc, or any other considerations one may think of that can form an argument such that it is necessary to violate another’s rights for this reason. Nozick claims to reject that natural absolute rights can be violated for any reason (Nozick 28).
4-Meaningful life is defined by Nozick as a life shaped in accordance to some overall plan (Nozick 50).
5-Nozick claims that individuals are, in general, rational agents (Nozick 48).
6-An unreliable procedure is defined by Nozick as a procedure that imposes too high a risk of finding people innocent when they are guilty or guilty when they are innocent (Nozick 102).
7-Nozick states that the dominant protection agency will not, and has no place in, interfering in disputes between two “independents” (Nozick 102).
8-An invisible hand process is defined as one that explains some collective outcome in terms of actions of many agents, none of which intended to produce that particular outcome but acted in such a way that the collective outcome necessarily arose (Miller 15).
9-The use of objective here (and for the remainder of the paper) is only for the purpose of argument. I am assuming that it is possible to objectively verify its truth for this example.
Works Cited
Lacey, A.R. Robert Nozick. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Mack, Eric and Gerald Gaus. “Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition” in Handbook of Political Theory edited by: Chandran Kukathas and Gerald Gaus. London, Sage Publications, 2004.
Miller, David. In Robert Nozick edited by David Schmidtz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. pgs. 34-58.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Paul, Jeffrey. Reading Nozick. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981.
Wolff, Jonathan. Robert Nozick: Property, Justice, and the Minimal State. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
This one is quite a read. It was brought about by an argument or two with some lib friends about the morality of any state. It is consistent with Knee-high-man’s accusation that I am merely a ‘shit disturbing anarchist’ (
), however I do believe in the need for the minimal state. In what follows I merely prove that there is no moral transition from the state of nature to the minimal state. In addition, I grant Nozick and the ‘individualist anarchists’ certain natural rights which there may or may not be issues with. The girl (brilliant and beautiful without equal), as always, helped at various junctures. Enjoy. I couldn’t figure out how to do footnotes, so I have included the footnotes in the *X* format. They can all be found at the end of the piece, ‘below the fold’. Also, let me add, that I am grateful for the audience. These extended posts are sweet for keeping my research and theory skills up while I’m on hiatus from more formal studies.--------------------------------------------------
The libertarian Nozick *1*, in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia, sets out to demonstrate that only a minimal state *2*, and nothing more extensive, can be morally justified (Miller 10). In response to Locke’s arguments against anarchy, Nozick feels that Locke dismissed the anarchist position too quickly and gives it a more thorough analysis (Wolff 42). The first part of Nozick’s book is geared toward the individualist anarchists, and he spends this portion of the book answering their moral objections to a state. Individual anarchists, such as Benjamin Tucker (who Nozick names), start with the same premise as Nozick, namely that individuals have inviolable rights to life, liberty, and property (16). Since both the individualist anarchists and Nozick share this theoretical ground, he finds himself obligated to answer their objections against the state. Nozick puts forth a theory that purports to show that the minimal state can arise from an ideal form of the state of nature by morally permissible means, and claims that it does so by not violating the natural rights of life, liberty, and property that Nozick believes all individuals have (later in his theory he adds the natural rights of self-defense and punishment) (Nozick 10). Nozick’s view on rights takes the form of Lockean natural rights that are negative in form, meaning that they act as moral side constraints on other’s actions towards you, rather than positive rights that are obligations others owe you. Nozick believes natural rights to be absolute and inviolable since each person’s life is separate and no one individual or his rights may be sacrificed for other considerations *3*. Nozick adopts the Kantian categorical imperative in his view of what individuals may rightfully do to one another. The Kantian view holds that people may only be treated as ends and not only as means since they are capable of having a life that is meaningful *4* (50). After introducing his view on natural rights, Nozick adds that all individuals have the non-natural and non-absolute right to a reliable procedure of justice (Wolff 63).
The individualist anarchists put forth two main moral objections to the formation of a state. Nozick takes these objections seriously, since both share the same premise that individuals have rights that are inviolable. Nozick aims to show that a minimal state can arise from the state of nature and preserve the individual’s inviolable rights each step of the way. It is his hope that he can answer the individual anarchist’s objections with his theory of the minimal state. The first of the individual anarchists’ objections concerns the state’s monopoly on the use of force (Nozick 51). When a state monopolizes the use of force within a geographical territory, the individual anarchists claim that it does so by punishing those who wish to defend their own rights by allowing the state to protect and enforce rights on their behalf. In the individual anarchists’ view, this is immoral since it violates the absolute right an individual has to self-defense and hence, the state is rights-violating and immoral. The second objection the individual anarchists’ put forth concerns the immoral forceful redistribution of property done by the state. When a state holds a monopoly over the use of force, and some individuals do not voluntarily allow the state to protect its rights, the state must somehow include them within its sphere of protection. Through the inclusion of the “independents”, whom would rather self-enforce their right to self-defense, the other individuals who voluntarily allowed the state to protect its rights must now pay for the protection of these “independents” by the state. The anarchists hold that the state has violated the right to property all individuals have when it forcefully makes the individuals, already within the state, pay for the “independents’” protection. Therefore, the individual anarchists conclude, the state is immoral and cannot be justified. Nozick now has the burden, in his defense of the minimal state, to first show that the dominant protection agency (to be explained later in this paper) is justified in protecting “independents” who want to defend their own rights (Paul 68). Second, Nozick must show the anarchists that forceful redistribution does not take place, but rather that it is an act of compensation as morally required by the principle of compensation. Unfortunately, Nozick fails to satisfactorily answer both objections, and due to his strict moral framework of inviolable rights, he is unable to make the theoretical moves he attempts to make while at the same time proving that the minimal state arises by a rights-preserving process. The individual anarchists’ complaints, in the end, are left unanswered and Nozick’s minimal state, by way of his and the individual anarchists’ own requirements, is left unjustified and proves to be immoral. Nozick’s theory of how the minimal state arises can be broken down into four parts. Nozick first looks at how the state of nature transitions to a mutual protection agency, second, how the minimal protection agency transitions to a dominant protection agency, third, Nozick shows the transition from the dominant protection agency to the ultraminimal state, and finally, Nozick moves from the ultraminimal state to the minimal state. Nozick, in his theory, uses Weber’s definition of a state (Nozick 37). Weber’s two criteria for a state include one, that there is a monopoly on the use of force in a geographical area and two, that it protects all individual’s rights within its geographical territory. Using these two criteria, Nozick sets out to show how the state, containing both of these criteria, can be rights-preserving and moral therefore, answering the individual anarchists’ two main moral objections to a state.
Starting from the state of nature Nozick informs the reader, especially his main target audience, the individual anarchists, that he will use an ideal form of the state of nature, one in which rights violations are the exception and not the norm, in order to show that the minimal state is an improvement on the state of nature (Nozick 55). Within the state of nature individuals have the natural rights to life (bodily integrity), liberty, to acquire property, as well as self-defense, and the right to punish others for rights-violations (Miller 12). Individuals are also able to transfer or exchange their rights with others who consent to the transfer. In order to better protect their rights, Nozick argues that individuals may band together to form mutual protection associations (Nozick 10). The group that is formed, Nozick points out, only has the rights individuals transfer to it ( i.e. to the other individuals in the group who are allowed to enforce them on the individual’s behalf), and no group has any special right above and beyond those transferred to it. Over time, individuals will realize that there are many inconveniences that come from the mutual protection agency such as individuals always being on call to serve their protective duties when one member purports that their rights were violated. Generally, Nozick argues, mutual protection associations will act in a correct manner since members will not want to waste time on false complaints of rights-violations.
The inconveniences of the mutual protection associations will, in the end, lead to a division of labor where entrepreneurs set up businesses to sell protective services (Wolff 44). The individuals who wish to avoid the inconveniences and risk of always being on call within the mutual protection agency, will chose to buy their protective services since this would be the rational thing to do *5*. Later, the protection agencies will find it in their interest to merge with one another since instead of constantly doing battle with one another, and they will be able to internally arbitrate the cases the more clients it has belonging to it, or only deal with issues concerning their clients and “independents”. The individuals, Nozick argues, will want to join the largest protection agency since they are rational and will find that the largest protection agency will better protect and enforce their rights against non-clients (Nozick 54). The protection agency at this point has now become the dominant protection agency in a certain geographical territory. David Miller, has put forth an objection to Nozick’s claim that rational individuals are bound to join the largest protection agency of an area (Miller 12). If the smaller agencies are more efficient, Miller argues, and are better able to enforce the client’s rights since they are smaller, then how can Nozick assume that the largest agency will have the comparative advantage? While this objection is important, it will be assumed that Nozick is correct to give him as much theoretical charity as possible.
At this point in Nozick’s theory there is a dominant protection agency, yet there are individual’s within the territory that he calls “independents” who insist on protecting and enforcing their own rights. The individual anarchist will correctly point out, that at this point the dominant protection agency and the “independents” may come into conflict as to what is the proper method for dealing with complaints of rights violations. The dominant protection agency will surely have its favored procedures for justice that it deems fair and reliable and possibly the “independents” will have theirs. So whose procedure of justice is correct? This stage of Nozick’s argument is crucial since it is at this point that he purports to answer satisfactorily the individual anarchists’ first objection and show that the dominant protection agency can justifiably hold a monopoly over rights-enforcement and punishment in the area. Nozick now has the burden to prove that the dominant protective agency can justifiably prohibit the “independents” from taking action against its clients (Miller 13). To protect its clients against the risks of the “independents,” or as Wolff calls them, the ‘John Wayne types’, Nozick argues that the dominant protection agency is justified in prohibiting the John Waynes from using unreliable procedures of justice *6*, since all individuals have the non-natural right to have a reliable procedure of justice used on them (Wolff 63). Nozick believes that the dominant protection agency will publish a list of objectively reliable procedures of justice that individuals are allowed to use against its clients (Nozick 102). If it finds an “independent” using an unapproved procedure they will be prohibited from doing so since they have “the muscle to do this”, and will ultimately prohibit their absolute right of self-defense in such cases *7*. It is now at this point that the dominant protection agency, Nozick states, has transitioned to an ultraminimal state due to the fact that it has satisfied the first condition of Weber’s definition of a state (having a monopoly of force in an area). The ultraminimal state has a de facto monopoly, not in the sense that it alone enforces rights, but in the sense that it alone decides which procedures are reliable and fair (Mack and Gaus 120).
Nozick believes he has shown the ultraminimal state to arise in a rights-preserving way since, he argues, the ultraminimal state has the power to prohibit “independents”, non-clients of the dominant protective agency, from using unreliable procedures against its clients. Nozick claims that it violates no one’s rights since it prohibits individuals from using unreliable procedures that it classifies as “risky behavior,” and furthermore, can be prohibited since it violates a client’s rights to a reliable procedure of justice. Nozick concludes that he has shown the individual anarchists that it is not an unjust imposition of a de facto monopoly since it arises by an invisible hand process *8*, uses morally permissible means, does not violate anyone’s rights, and does so without claims to a special right above those that have been transferred to it by its members (Nozick 114-115).
Unfortunately, Nozick has failed to satisfactorily answer the individual anarchist’s first objection. An individual’s right to have a reliable procedure of justice used on them is not a natural right like the other rights Nozick presents (right to life, liberty, self-defense, and punishment), and is only justified by Nozick on the basis that an unreliable procedure may produce fear if it is used (Nozick 105, 114-115 and Wolff 63). Therefore, it seems that Nozick is constraining the absolute right of self-defense with the non-absolute right of a reliable procedure. For example, let us imagine that the “independent” believes, and has objectively *9* had his natural right to property violated by a client. Whether he is correct or wrong it does not matter since he has an absolute right to self-defense. Let us suppose that the “independent” uses an objectively unreliable procedure against the client to find out if the client is guilty, and the dominant protection agency reacts in self-defense on behalf of its client to resist the objectively unreliable procedure as Nozick says it may (on behalf of the client). One may then ask which use of self-defense is correct? If self-defense is an absolute right, which it is under Nozick’s view, then both seem to be correct in using it. Nozick states that even if the client is guilty, the dominant protection agency can act in self-defense against the unreliable procedure and prohibit its use (Nozick 108). It would be arbitrary to choose one use of self-defense as correct over the other since both have an absolute right to self-defense, and their ability to use their right to self-defense does not bear on whether the client is guilty or not. Nozick wants to say that the client has a right to have a reliable procedure used on him. A clash of rights takes place (both the dominant protection agency, acting on behalf of its client and self-defending against the procedure, and the independent have the right to use their absolute right to self-defense), yet Nozick sides with constraining the “independent’s” right to self-defense, no matter if the client is guilty or not, since John Wayne used an unreliable procedure. Nozick assumes the right to a reliable procedure of justice, and does not ground it in the natural rights foundation (Wolff 63). If anything, the individual anarchists would say to thwart the non-absolute right to a fair procedure since it is the only one that can be violated seeing that it is a non-natural right. Theorists such as Wolff suggest that it would be conducive to Nozick’s defense if he grounded the right to a fair procedure in the natural and absolute right of liberty, but Nozick, in the end, does not. If self-defense can be thwarted by a non-absolute right (the right to a reliable procedure of justice), which is the case in Nozick’s theory, Nozick has failed to show that the ultraminimal state has arisen by a non-rights violating manner (Wolff 72). It is not consistent with Nozick’s theory to choose one use of self-defense as correct over the other just because the client’s non-absolute right to a reliable procedure has been violated . Therefore, the individual anarchist will reject Nozick’s answer to their first objection.
The individual anarchists can bring up another problem with Nozick’s theory. How can the dominant protection agency be sure that they know which procedures are objectively reliable? If for example, the dominant protection agency only believes to be using a correct procedure, and the “independent”, in contrast, uses a procedure that can be, for the sake of argument, objectively verified as correct, then this is another case of rights-violation (Wolff 72). By having the dominant protection agency prohibit the objectively correct procedure used by the “independent”, it is violating the “independent’s” right to self-defense and also is violating the right all individuals have to a reliable procedure since the procedure the dominant protection agency approves of is objectively wrong even though, for the sake of argument, they believe it to be correct (Miller 19). Overall, the individual anarchists will conclude that Nozick has failed to show how “independents” can be prohibited from enforcing their right to self-defense. The only way for Nozick to answer this objection is to assume that the objectively reliable procedures can be known, and that the dominant protection agency uses them.
Nozick must also assume that all the “independents” used objectively unreliable procedures . If for instance, all the “independents” complied with the list of procedures the dominant protection agency produced, but simply had non-monetary reasons for remaining “independents” (meaning they could afford protective services but chose not to buy them) then there would be no way for the dominant protection agency to include them under their sphere of protection. Either Nozick must assume that all “independents” used unreliable procedures which is far fetched, or his theory is prevented at this point from going forward, or they must forcibly be included in order for a state to arise which would violate their natural right to self-defense, and liberty.
In order to give Nozick as much theoretical charity as possible, we will continue with his theory. Nozick claims that the ultraminimal state is morally required, by the principle of compensation, to compensate for any disadvantages the “independent” suffers by not being able to defend himself since he was prohibited from doing so by the dominant protection agency who felt his procedure to be too “risky”. Nozick argues that the compensation must be in the form of protective services if the “independent” cannot afford them, minus any costs the “independent” would have incurred if he were to have been able to self-defend (Nozick 111). By including the “independent(s)” under its protective sphere, Nozick claims that the ultraminimal state has transformed to a minimal state since it satisfies the second condition; it protects all people within its territory. Nozick claims to have answered the individual anarchists’ second objection since the ultraminimal state did not forcefully redistribute property to pay for the “independent’s” protective services, but merely compensated the “independent” as it is morally required to do so. Therefore, Nozick claims, he has shown how the minimal state can arise by an invisible hand process as well as by morally permissible means.
Nozick, as with the first individualist anarchist’s objection, has failed to answer satisfactory the second worry of the anarchists’ that what Nozick calls compensation is really redistribution. Nozick admits that he never justifies the principle of compensation, and more importantly is only a morally required procedure so therefore, it cannot be enforced (Nozick 110-111). The problem with this is the fact that Nozick has differentiated between what you are morally required to do and what the state can morally force you to do (Wolff 23). In this case, the ultraminimal state cannot force the client to pay compensation since this would violate their absolute right to property, and can only hope their clients act morally. Nozick has to assume that all of the clients within the ultraminimal state realize the moral requirement to pay compensation and, furthermore, act upon their realization, instead of either not realizing and acting upon it, or seeing it as forced redistribution (Wolff 67). This poses a problem for Nozick since he has to make a large assumption as to the behavior and beliefs of clients since the principle of compensation is only morally correct yet non-enforceable. Without such large assumptions, Nozick’s theory fails to satisfactorily answer the anarchist’s second objection.
Another problem with Nozick’s reasoning is that Nozick himself states that the compensation must be deemed satisfactory by the individual who is being compensated (Lacey 63 and Nozick 55). The compensation Nozick offers is only to those who cannot afford protective services, yet this seems fallacious. There may be “independents” who decided not to join the ultraminimal state for reasons other then monetary inability. Furthermore, Nozick later contradicts his statement that the clients are morally required to compensate the “independent” due to him being prohibited from using his absolute right to self defend (Nozick 78-79). While this has earlier been shown to pose a problem, there is a second problem, namely that Nozick contradicts the reason he gave earlier in the book for when compensation is required by later saying that only those who cannot afford the services will be compensated (i.e. given protective services for free or at a reduced price) (111). If the “independents” are disadvantaged by not being allowed to use their absolute right, then the anarchists would surely find it fallacious that Nozick wishes to compensate only those who can afford the ultraminimal state’s protection with services they had already rejected. Furthermore, Nozick tries to distract the individual anarchists with talk of compensation when they would object to Nozick’s claim that one can violate absolute right by thwarting it with a non-absolute right and then trying to compensate for it with protective services the ‘John Wayne types’ don’t even want (expect for those who were precluded from joining only on the basis of monetary inability).
Ultimately, Nozick makes assumptions and commits rights violations that the individual anarchist would not allow. Nozick leaves both of the anarchist objections unanswered, and has failed to properly show how the minimal state could arise with morally permissible steps. The assumptions he makes about what the individual’s beliefs and actions will be within his theory, do not have a strong enough basis to answer the anarchist’s objections. Furthermore, the strict moral foundation Nozick rests his theory on precludes him from looking to ways of violating them in a proper or allowable manner. No matter what type of compensation or other constraining rights Nozick brings to the table, the individual anarchist will surely object.
1-Nozick is a deontologist since he believes that rights must be adhered to no matter what the consequences are. He also takes a consequentialist stance, which justifies an act by its consequence, when he states that a minimal state will be an improvement on the state of nature (Lacey 22, 71).
2-A minimal state, or as Nozick calls it a ‘night watchman state’ would simply be a police force, an army, and law courts and nothing more (Wolff 36, Nozick 25).
3-Other considerations may include utilitarian rights where one’s rights can be violated if considerations of maximum happiness come into play etc, or any other considerations one may think of that can form an argument such that it is necessary to violate another’s rights for this reason. Nozick claims to reject that natural absolute rights can be violated for any reason (Nozick 28).
4-Meaningful life is defined by Nozick as a life shaped in accordance to some overall plan (Nozick 50).
5-Nozick claims that individuals are, in general, rational agents (Nozick 48).
6-An unreliable procedure is defined by Nozick as a procedure that imposes too high a risk of finding people innocent when they are guilty or guilty when they are innocent (Nozick 102).
7-Nozick states that the dominant protection agency will not, and has no place in, interfering in disputes between two “independents” (Nozick 102).
8-An invisible hand process is defined as one that explains some collective outcome in terms of actions of many agents, none of which intended to produce that particular outcome but acted in such a way that the collective outcome necessarily arose (Miller 15).
9-The use of objective here (and for the remainder of the paper) is only for the purpose of argument. I am assuming that it is possible to objectively verify its truth for this example.
Lacey, A.R. Robert Nozick. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Mack, Eric and Gerald Gaus. “Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition” in Handbook of Political Theory edited by: Chandran Kukathas and Gerald Gaus. London, Sage Publications, 2004.
Miller, David. In Robert Nozick edited by David Schmidtz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. pgs. 34-58.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Paul, Jeffrey. Reading Nozick. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981.
Wolff, Jonathan. Robert Nozick: Property, Justice, and the Minimal State. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
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