Kukathas - ‘Politics of Indifference’ AKA Shut the F**k Up ‘Cultural Groups’
One issue currently dominating the discussion of contemporary political theory is how to deal with cultural diversity and the claims: moral, legal, cultural, linguistic or religious made by various actors (Kukathas Handbook 250). One proposed way to deal with these issues falls under the heading of politics of difference – equality of participation and inclusion of all groups sometimes requiring that disadvantaged or oppressed groups be given differential treatment in social policy (Young Justice 158). This position is a reaction to a form of liberalism that assumes basic individual human rights would resolve the claims of national minorities. Advocates of the politics of difference argue that human rights cannot resolve contentious issues such as what language should be recognized publicly, whether there should be funded public education in the minority tongue, or if minorities should be allowed to form their own local regions (Kukathas Handbook 251). The politics of indifference takes a different stance and recommends that liberalism resist the demand for recognition (Kukathas Indifference 687). Liberalism, according to the politics of indifference, takes no interest in the character or identity of the individuals, or their collective projects or group preferences (691). It maintains that the state is only concerned with upholding the framework of the law within which individuals and groups can function peacefully.
Kukathas is one such advocate of the politics of indifference. His theory allows for the most diversity to come under his definition of liberalism, and refuses to make assumptions as to what justice or equality means, something which the theorists of differential politics propose in their theories. Kukathas makes one assumption as to the universal nature of humans by proposing that all humans share an interest in following their conscience; this assumption includes any and all conceptions of the good life (Archipelago 29). No matter what an individual believes or what morals and values that individual holds they will have an interest in following their belief. The politics of indifference allows for the peaceful coexistence of difference, while the politics of difference advocated by theorists such as Iris Young and Will Kymlicka base their theories around assumptions about what equality, justice, and rights are – assumptions that are inconsistent with their goal of preserving group distinctness. What Young and Kymlicka share is a tendency to advocate views that are founded on assumptions of rights and values that end up acting as a barrier for diversity and also force liberal assumptions upon groups and individuals who may not share those views. I contend that Kukathas’ theory of indifference is superior to the assumptions proposed by theorists who advocate politics of difference, and I will show how Kukathas’ theory could be more consistent by rethinking his basis for the freedom of exit. Kukathas’ theory allows for nearly all diversity to be brought together under peaceful coexistence, while the politics of difference proposes a counterproductive theory that fails to attain its goal of preserving diversity. I will discuss the views put forth by Young and Kymlicka bringing up objections put forth by Kukathas, as well as my own, to show how their theories are internally inconsistent and when analyzed prove to be based on false claims.
Kukathas begins by pointing out that throughout history there has been tension between human cooperation and unrelenting conflict (Hawkings 589). Kukathas’ liberalism, his politics of indifference, appears to be the best solution to this tension insofar as its emphasis is on the greatest possible individual freedoms. Kukathas’ theory is different from the theories put forth by Young and Kymlicka since it is not founded on the disputed conceptions of justice and equality. Kukathas believes that it would be incoherent to do so since he points out that such topics are controversial and no one meaning of these terms can claim superiority (590). Political liberalism as seen in Kukathas’ theory makes no appeal to substantial moral conceptions and only advocates a minimal moral conception needed for peaceful coexistence. Kukathas does make one assumption about human nature and motivation, but it is an assumption that allows for all individual conceptions of justice, freedom, beliefs, and morals to be brought into its framework. He asserts a Humean view of human nature motivated by self-interest, affection, and principle with the modification that the motive of principle entails living according to one’s conscience (592). Hume’s term ‘principle’, according to Kukathas, is too narrow and implies that there must be an element of deliberation and reflection involved and for Kukathas this need not be the case (Archipelago 48). Conscience will sometimes trump other motivations, and it is what makes us distinctly human. Sometimes beliefs, especially religious ones, are so deeply held that they are beyond deliberation or reflection and are simply blindly accepted by the individual. The unexamined life, for Kukathas, is one that is free and is worth living. Even though Kukathas’ theory hinges on the assumption that freedom of conscience is the most important human interest, it is one that includes every embodiment of individualism, allowing all views to be accommodated.
For Kukathas, the free society is one where there are many associations and multiple authorities but none is privileged as morally superior (Archipelago 19). The multiple authorities arising in this conception of the free society will rest their authority not on an assumed definition of justice but simply on their acquiescence of subjects. A society can be seen as liberal to the extent that it tolerates dissent as well as illiberal associations within it. A truly liberal society should not attempt to overturn laws of illiberal associations within it on the basis that it would violate freedom of conscience. Individuals are allowed in this society to reject the authority of one association, exit the society whose authority was rejected, and accept the authority of another association (25). The fundamental principle Kukathas upholds for a free society is the principle of freedom of association, meaning that an individual in a free society can associate with whatever group they wish (75). The first corollary of this principle is the principle of freedom of disassociation. This is needed to allow people to exit associations they find to act against their conscience. No one conception of justice or beliefs in general can be appealed to as morally superior since the standards for these definitions are in dispute. Therefore, individuals must be allowed to exit associations. A second corollary to the principle of freedom of association is the principle of mutual toleration of associations (75). A society is free if it and its authorities uphold these minimal moral conceptions. Society according to this view, should not be founded on disputed ideas of social justice or equality, but rather a mutual toleration for all possible conceptions of these views that are embodied in different associations. This view is the most encompassing of all the theorists that will be examined here, especially since it allows all people to live freely by their cultural standards as long as it does not threaten the legal and political order that allows for peaceful coexistence (Kukathas Indifference 690). To be sure, upholding the rule of law by the state may require intervention in the affairs of individuals and groups, but liberal politics is not concerned with these affairs in themselves.
There is one assumption that Kukathas needs to be rid of in his theory in order to be consistent against assumptions such as metaphysical rights and undisputed terms of justice and equality; the very things that make his theory attractive in the first place. Kukathas, in my view, wrongly grounds the freedom of disassociation, the freedom to exit, as an inalienable right of individuals (Archipelago 96). Kukathas goes on to say that this view does not give agents fundamental rights, but in fact it does. The rest of Kukathas’ theory, besides the assumptions of human interest which are allowable since they encompass all variations of individuals, does not derive theoretical grounding on disputed ideas such as fundamental rights of equality and justice. Kukathas protests that social justice, equality, and the idea of the good society are heavily disputed and vary between cultures as well as among the individuals within cultures. His theory would be more thoroughly consistent if he grounded the right to exit on the freedom of conscience as well as the practicality it affords. Individuals must be allowed to exit not because of a controversial claim about metaphysical rights, but rather because it prevents violence and allows for peaceful coexistence.
Iris Young, in contrast to Kukathas, does not focus on the individual as the basic unit of her theory as Kukathas does, but rather on groups in general. The politics of difference Young advocates begins with an appeal for equality of group participation and inclusion in social policy that sometimes requires differential treatment for the oppressed (Justice 157). Right out of the gate, Young bases her entire theory on the fallacious assumption that equality is an undisputed term. As Kukathas adeptly notes, diversity and equality are incompatible (Archipelago 214). To promote equality between groups would mean disposing of all the things that make them unique, a consequence that is not consistent with the stated goal of preserving group difference. Young argues that in order to promote social justice, another term she assumes is uncontroversial, social policy must accord differential treatment to groups – hence the term politics of difference (Justice 158). In Young’s vision of the good society, group differences are not eliminated or transcended but rather there is equality among groups (163). Once again, Young only allows diversity to exist within a narrow framework of what she believes is the good society. It is simply not true that all groups share the idea that equality between groups is what the good life embodies. Also, Young is quick to assume that pushing equality between groups in social policy will have no adverse effect to the distinct culture within these groups. Repositioning the groups according to Young’s narrow definition of equality, the inclusion of all groups in social policy, may change the unique character of a group’s identity, their beliefs and all the elements Young’s theory ironically tries to preserve. Young also assumes that she knows what aspects should be equalized and acknowledged in the social policy she advocates, and makes no mention of how the equality is to be specifically decided.
Young objects to the politics of indifference since first, she believes that blindness to difference disadvantages groups that differ from the privileged groups (Justice 164). According to Young, the privileged groups define the standards according to which all are measured, tending to put the unprivileged groups at a disadvantage. The ironic aspect is that Young’s theory puts forth disputed concepts of justice and equality that may marginalize a group’s own idea of what those concepts mean, including both disadvantaged and oppressed groups. As Kukathas notes, groups may use a different metric of equality and justice and these may be metrics that are not compatible with Young’s notion (Archipelago 223). Second, Young believes blindness to difference perpetuates cultural imperialism by allowing norms that the dominate group defines to appear as neutral (165). Young is misguided and puts forth an objection that applies to her own theory – Young’s ideas are far from neutral and will clearly disadvantage those who stray from these definitions. Her theory argues that asserting values of the disadvantaged cultures will result in relativizing the dominant group(s) that can no longer claim their norms to be universal. Politics of difference will also, according to Young, promote the notion of group solidarity against the individualism of liberal humanism. Young assumes that group solidarity is a goal worth pursuing even though she wants diversity. It would seem to be more consistent with her stance if she allowed for the most variation as possible since she strives to preserve cultural difference. Kukathas raises an important objection; unity, even within a group, suppresses diversity (Archipelago 214). Young also argues that groups cannot be equal unless their experiences and culture are publicly affirmed (Justice 174). It is irrational for Young, or anyone, to assume that the state is omniscient and can know what all the cultural characteristics of a group are or to assume that a group, especially a divided one, can vocalize them. It is also important to note that Young is only concerned with specific representation for social groups, groups that share a set of practices, and not ideological groups since she claims it is the social groups that will contribute to social knowledge important for political discussion. It seems outrageous for Young to assume that first, social groups can better contribute to the social knowledge of a political discussion, and two, to assume that no groups are divided such that one portion of the group dissents based on a political ideology. It seems apparent that if Young really wants a robust political discussion she would advocate for including ideological groups.
Kymlicka, like Young, advocates for the politics of difference. He believes that special rights are consistent with the liberal commitment of ‘genuine equality’ and to individual autonomy. The context of individual autonomy is the range of options passed down to us by our language and culture therefore, these must be preserved (Rights 140). His theory proposes that different political powers be based on ethnicity and agrees with Dworkin that justice requires removing disadvantages that are morally arbitrary, especially ones that have been present from birth. It is not clear how Kymlicka or Dworkin, arrived at the idea that this is what justice requires. Their assumption of meaning is heavily controversial since no one universal idea of justice exists. As Kukathas objects, diversity and justice are only compatible if there are several conceptions of justice (Archipelago 181). Kymlicka would disagree, as he does in Earthly Goods, and states that there is indeed a general concept of justice (45). Kymlicka advocates for special rights to insulate the national minority from decisions made by the majority culture that may undermine the minority’s viability (141). Kukathas rejects that groups have a right to survive (Archipelago 77). As Kukathas notes, diversity among groups will lead to inequalities in outcomes – some groups will be wealthier, some larger, and some may cease to exist. Their only freedom derives from their freedom to associate. Kymlicka’s theory differentiates between national minorities who self-governed at one point before colonization, and immigrants who voluntarily decided to leave their own society. Kymlicka believes national minorities are those that need special rights since their incorporation into the multinational state was involuntary while the immigrants should be expected to assimilate since it was their choice to leave their culture (83). As Kukathas notes, Kymlicka is quick to assume that these two groups can be easily distinguished – this is clearly not the case.
Like Young, Kymlicka wishes to accommodate differences and have equality between groups, but is against intervention within groups. Kymlicka also assumes, like Young does, that the repositioning of groups according to a contested definition of what equality means will not disrupt the cultural character of the group. Furthermore, Kymlicka states that a national minority should be free to decide how to control their homeland according to principles of justice. This means that groups are only free to be consistent with Kymlicka’s assumed idea of what justice is, having equality between groups, when they control their homeland (Earthly 45). Both the concepts of justice and equality are assumed by Kymlicka to be universally defined which is clearly not the case. Kymlicka contradicts himself in various parts of his theory by rejecting the idea of forcing liberal principles on groups, but forbids groups to pose internal restrictions on members to question or revise their beliefs; basically groups cannot limit individual autonomy (Kukathas Handbook 252). Kymlicka wants to protect group uniqueness but also not allow groups that forbid questioning of their beliefs. Kymlicka’s theory is not liberal at all since many religious groups, among others, would be forbidden to freely exist. Support for groups given by the state, according to Kymlicka, should also be done fairly (Multiculturalism 115). Just like many of his other concepts, Kymlicka assumes there is one general definition of fairness, or if there is not, that the state has epistemic access to all the differing values of fairness groups hold. Both of these ideas are laughably fallacious. Kymlicka also argues that the state can not be neutral in its actions since it regularly advocates for certain symbols and holidays that belong to a certain culture (111). Therefore, no matter what, the state can not act with benign neglect to cultural difference (108). Furthermore, states have citizenship rights which can be seen as evidence, he claims, that states already have group differentiated rights (Multiculturalism 124). As Kukathas notes, states are not neutral in character but accidents of history that can explain why states advocate certain cultural holidays and symbols (Indifference 696). Furthermore, citizenship does not need to be grounded in anything further than practicality, and if groups have such a strong attachment to their language or cultural practices they may exit.
As argued above, Young and Kymlicka’s theories of the politics of difference fail to be theoretically consistent, and are grounded on controversial concepts that they put forth with naïve moral certitude. The equality they propose to bring about between groups will obviously chip away a group’s uniqueness and have lasting affects on its character. Furthermore, Kymlicka’s theory would only allow groups that promote individual autonomy – a requirement that will exclude numerous groups. Kukathas’ theory, with the minor correction recommended herein, is theoretically superior to the others and is not based on damaging ethnocentric assumptions. His theory encompasses the most diversity and is obviously the best solution to ethnic, individual, and group tension.
Works Cited
Gaus, Gerald and Chandran Kukathas. Handbook of Political Theory. London: Sage Publications, 2004.
Hampson, Fen and Judith Reppy (editors). Chapter Five Will Kymlicka. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996.
Hawkings, Deborah. “Tolerance and Freedom of Association: A Lockean State of Nature.” Social Theory and Practice (Oct. 2004): 589-598.
Kukathas, Chandran. “Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference.” Political Theory (Oct. 1998): 686-699.
---. The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
---. “The Rights of Minority Cultures.” Political Theory (Feb. 1992): 140-146.
Young, Iris. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Kukathas begins by pointing out that throughout history there has been tension between human cooperation and unrelenting conflict (Hawkings 589). Kukathas’ liberalism, his politics of indifference, appears to be the best solution to this tension insofar as its emphasis is on the greatest possible individual freedoms. Kukathas’ theory is different from the theories put forth by Young and Kymlicka since it is not founded on the disputed conceptions of justice and equality. Kukathas believes that it would be incoherent to do so since he points out that such topics are controversial and no one meaning of these terms can claim superiority (590). Political liberalism as seen in Kukathas’ theory makes no appeal to substantial moral conceptions and only advocates a minimal moral conception needed for peaceful coexistence. Kukathas does make one assumption about human nature and motivation, but it is an assumption that allows for all individual conceptions of justice, freedom, beliefs, and morals to be brought into its framework. He asserts a Humean view of human nature motivated by self-interest, affection, and principle with the modification that the motive of principle entails living according to one’s conscience (592). Hume’s term ‘principle’, according to Kukathas, is too narrow and implies that there must be an element of deliberation and reflection involved and for Kukathas this need not be the case (Archipelago 48). Conscience will sometimes trump other motivations, and it is what makes us distinctly human. Sometimes beliefs, especially religious ones, are so deeply held that they are beyond deliberation or reflection and are simply blindly accepted by the individual. The unexamined life, for Kukathas, is one that is free and is worth living. Even though Kukathas’ theory hinges on the assumption that freedom of conscience is the most important human interest, it is one that includes every embodiment of individualism, allowing all views to be accommodated.
For Kukathas, the free society is one where there are many associations and multiple authorities but none is privileged as morally superior (Archipelago 19). The multiple authorities arising in this conception of the free society will rest their authority not on an assumed definition of justice but simply on their acquiescence of subjects. A society can be seen as liberal to the extent that it tolerates dissent as well as illiberal associations within it. A truly liberal society should not attempt to overturn laws of illiberal associations within it on the basis that it would violate freedom of conscience. Individuals are allowed in this society to reject the authority of one association, exit the society whose authority was rejected, and accept the authority of another association (25). The fundamental principle Kukathas upholds for a free society is the principle of freedom of association, meaning that an individual in a free society can associate with whatever group they wish (75). The first corollary of this principle is the principle of freedom of disassociation. This is needed to allow people to exit associations they find to act against their conscience. No one conception of justice or beliefs in general can be appealed to as morally superior since the standards for these definitions are in dispute. Therefore, individuals must be allowed to exit associations. A second corollary to the principle of freedom of association is the principle of mutual toleration of associations (75). A society is free if it and its authorities uphold these minimal moral conceptions. Society according to this view, should not be founded on disputed ideas of social justice or equality, but rather a mutual toleration for all possible conceptions of these views that are embodied in different associations. This view is the most encompassing of all the theorists that will be examined here, especially since it allows all people to live freely by their cultural standards as long as it does not threaten the legal and political order that allows for peaceful coexistence (Kukathas Indifference 690). To be sure, upholding the rule of law by the state may require intervention in the affairs of individuals and groups, but liberal politics is not concerned with these affairs in themselves.
There is one assumption that Kukathas needs to be rid of in his theory in order to be consistent against assumptions such as metaphysical rights and undisputed terms of justice and equality; the very things that make his theory attractive in the first place. Kukathas, in my view, wrongly grounds the freedom of disassociation, the freedom to exit, as an inalienable right of individuals (Archipelago 96). Kukathas goes on to say that this view does not give agents fundamental rights, but in fact it does. The rest of Kukathas’ theory, besides the assumptions of human interest which are allowable since they encompass all variations of individuals, does not derive theoretical grounding on disputed ideas such as fundamental rights of equality and justice. Kukathas protests that social justice, equality, and the idea of the good society are heavily disputed and vary between cultures as well as among the individuals within cultures. His theory would be more thoroughly consistent if he grounded the right to exit on the freedom of conscience as well as the practicality it affords. Individuals must be allowed to exit not because of a controversial claim about metaphysical rights, but rather because it prevents violence and allows for peaceful coexistence.
Iris Young, in contrast to Kukathas, does not focus on the individual as the basic unit of her theory as Kukathas does, but rather on groups in general. The politics of difference Young advocates begins with an appeal for equality of group participation and inclusion in social policy that sometimes requires differential treatment for the oppressed (Justice 157). Right out of the gate, Young bases her entire theory on the fallacious assumption that equality is an undisputed term. As Kukathas adeptly notes, diversity and equality are incompatible (Archipelago 214). To promote equality between groups would mean disposing of all the things that make them unique, a consequence that is not consistent with the stated goal of preserving group difference. Young argues that in order to promote social justice, another term she assumes is uncontroversial, social policy must accord differential treatment to groups – hence the term politics of difference (Justice 158). In Young’s vision of the good society, group differences are not eliminated or transcended but rather there is equality among groups (163). Once again, Young only allows diversity to exist within a narrow framework of what she believes is the good society. It is simply not true that all groups share the idea that equality between groups is what the good life embodies. Also, Young is quick to assume that pushing equality between groups in social policy will have no adverse effect to the distinct culture within these groups. Repositioning the groups according to Young’s narrow definition of equality, the inclusion of all groups in social policy, may change the unique character of a group’s identity, their beliefs and all the elements Young’s theory ironically tries to preserve. Young also assumes that she knows what aspects should be equalized and acknowledged in the social policy she advocates, and makes no mention of how the equality is to be specifically decided.
Young objects to the politics of indifference since first, she believes that blindness to difference disadvantages groups that differ from the privileged groups (Justice 164). According to Young, the privileged groups define the standards according to which all are measured, tending to put the unprivileged groups at a disadvantage. The ironic aspect is that Young’s theory puts forth disputed concepts of justice and equality that may marginalize a group’s own idea of what those concepts mean, including both disadvantaged and oppressed groups. As Kukathas notes, groups may use a different metric of equality and justice and these may be metrics that are not compatible with Young’s notion (Archipelago 223). Second, Young believes blindness to difference perpetuates cultural imperialism by allowing norms that the dominate group defines to appear as neutral (165). Young is misguided and puts forth an objection that applies to her own theory – Young’s ideas are far from neutral and will clearly disadvantage those who stray from these definitions. Her theory argues that asserting values of the disadvantaged cultures will result in relativizing the dominant group(s) that can no longer claim their norms to be universal. Politics of difference will also, according to Young, promote the notion of group solidarity against the individualism of liberal humanism. Young assumes that group solidarity is a goal worth pursuing even though she wants diversity. It would seem to be more consistent with her stance if she allowed for the most variation as possible since she strives to preserve cultural difference. Kukathas raises an important objection; unity, even within a group, suppresses diversity (Archipelago 214). Young also argues that groups cannot be equal unless their experiences and culture are publicly affirmed (Justice 174). It is irrational for Young, or anyone, to assume that the state is omniscient and can know what all the cultural characteristics of a group are or to assume that a group, especially a divided one, can vocalize them. It is also important to note that Young is only concerned with specific representation for social groups, groups that share a set of practices, and not ideological groups since she claims it is the social groups that will contribute to social knowledge important for political discussion. It seems outrageous for Young to assume that first, social groups can better contribute to the social knowledge of a political discussion, and two, to assume that no groups are divided such that one portion of the group dissents based on a political ideology. It seems apparent that if Young really wants a robust political discussion she would advocate for including ideological groups.
Kymlicka, like Young, advocates for the politics of difference. He believes that special rights are consistent with the liberal commitment of ‘genuine equality’ and to individual autonomy. The context of individual autonomy is the range of options passed down to us by our language and culture therefore, these must be preserved (Rights 140). His theory proposes that different political powers be based on ethnicity and agrees with Dworkin that justice requires removing disadvantages that are morally arbitrary, especially ones that have been present from birth. It is not clear how Kymlicka or Dworkin, arrived at the idea that this is what justice requires. Their assumption of meaning is heavily controversial since no one universal idea of justice exists. As Kukathas objects, diversity and justice are only compatible if there are several conceptions of justice (Archipelago 181). Kymlicka would disagree, as he does in Earthly Goods, and states that there is indeed a general concept of justice (45). Kymlicka advocates for special rights to insulate the national minority from decisions made by the majority culture that may undermine the minority’s viability (141). Kukathas rejects that groups have a right to survive (Archipelago 77). As Kukathas notes, diversity among groups will lead to inequalities in outcomes – some groups will be wealthier, some larger, and some may cease to exist. Their only freedom derives from their freedom to associate. Kymlicka’s theory differentiates between national minorities who self-governed at one point before colonization, and immigrants who voluntarily decided to leave their own society. Kymlicka believes national minorities are those that need special rights since their incorporation into the multinational state was involuntary while the immigrants should be expected to assimilate since it was their choice to leave their culture (83). As Kukathas notes, Kymlicka is quick to assume that these two groups can be easily distinguished – this is clearly not the case.
Like Young, Kymlicka wishes to accommodate differences and have equality between groups, but is against intervention within groups. Kymlicka also assumes, like Young does, that the repositioning of groups according to a contested definition of what equality means will not disrupt the cultural character of the group. Furthermore, Kymlicka states that a national minority should be free to decide how to control their homeland according to principles of justice. This means that groups are only free to be consistent with Kymlicka’s assumed idea of what justice is, having equality between groups, when they control their homeland (Earthly 45). Both the concepts of justice and equality are assumed by Kymlicka to be universally defined which is clearly not the case. Kymlicka contradicts himself in various parts of his theory by rejecting the idea of forcing liberal principles on groups, but forbids groups to pose internal restrictions on members to question or revise their beliefs; basically groups cannot limit individual autonomy (Kukathas Handbook 252). Kymlicka wants to protect group uniqueness but also not allow groups that forbid questioning of their beliefs. Kymlicka’s theory is not liberal at all since many religious groups, among others, would be forbidden to freely exist. Support for groups given by the state, according to Kymlicka, should also be done fairly (Multiculturalism 115). Just like many of his other concepts, Kymlicka assumes there is one general definition of fairness, or if there is not, that the state has epistemic access to all the differing values of fairness groups hold. Both of these ideas are laughably fallacious. Kymlicka also argues that the state can not be neutral in its actions since it regularly advocates for certain symbols and holidays that belong to a certain culture (111). Therefore, no matter what, the state can not act with benign neglect to cultural difference (108). Furthermore, states have citizenship rights which can be seen as evidence, he claims, that states already have group differentiated rights (Multiculturalism 124). As Kukathas notes, states are not neutral in character but accidents of history that can explain why states advocate certain cultural holidays and symbols (Indifference 696). Furthermore, citizenship does not need to be grounded in anything further than practicality, and if groups have such a strong attachment to their language or cultural practices they may exit.
As argued above, Young and Kymlicka’s theories of the politics of difference fail to be theoretically consistent, and are grounded on controversial concepts that they put forth with naïve moral certitude. The equality they propose to bring about between groups will obviously chip away a group’s uniqueness and have lasting affects on its character. Furthermore, Kymlicka’s theory would only allow groups that promote individual autonomy – a requirement that will exclude numerous groups. Kukathas’ theory, with the minor correction recommended herein, is theoretically superior to the others and is not based on damaging ethnocentric assumptions. His theory encompasses the most diversity and is obviously the best solution to ethnic, individual, and group tension.
Works Cited
Gaus, Gerald and Chandran Kukathas. Handbook of Political Theory. London: Sage Publications, 2004.
Hampson, Fen and Judith Reppy (editors). Chapter Five Will Kymlicka. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996.
Hawkings, Deborah. “Tolerance and Freedom of Association: A Lockean State of Nature.” Social Theory and Practice (Oct. 2004): 589-598.
Kukathas, Chandran. “Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference.” Political Theory (Oct. 1998): 686-699.
---. The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
---. “The Rights of Minority Cultures.” Political Theory (Feb. 1992): 140-146.
Young, Iris. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
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