Say Anything Blog

This book has been getting some attention since it was published and, well, that really bothers me for a few reasons. It was written by an nontenured lit professor and an Italian inmate and I feel its total bullshit, delusions of paranoid sci-fi influenced post-modernist libs. What follows is my refuting their basic ideas the best I can in three or four pages. ‘Empire’ and ‘society of control’ are used synonymously in the piece. Also ‘biopower’ is used as a kind of human-based mechanism whereby the empire can expand through a sort of homogenization (...or something - Its kinda difficult to deal with these kooks using their terminology). Also I apologize in advance for citing people like Foucault, who I know many or all of you take issue with, but one must meet and beat these bastards on their own playground. Enjoy.

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A ‘society of control’ does not characterize contemporary international politics. There are many things that seem to evidence the existence and spread of ‘Empire’; a transnational, decentralized, self-propagating entity of networks; but this evidence actually reinforces the traditional sovereign states model and traditional inter-state relations. While it is clear that some aspects of the ‘society of control’ idea are true; for example, we have seen a shift from the disciplinary, Cold War-style discrete social norms to more post-modern norms (Hart 178, Campbell 172, L. 12/7). Working against this is the current popularity of nationalism, reminiscent of the Cold War, which continues to reinforce state sovereignty. Furthermore, many states reject the idea of Empire and the proliferation of capitalism – many of these states are not isolated and interact in business and politics with states that would generally be tempting candidates for inclusion in the Empire. When these more powerful, ‘society of control’ states interact with anti-capitalist or more socialist states, the importance of the state status and sovereignty is reinforced through mutual recognition and the accompanying diplomatic protocols (Bull 263). Even transnational banks and businesses, entities that seem to be part of the key to extending the ‘Empire’, interact and do business only with and within sovereign states. It is the stability and presence of a traditional states-system that recognizes and allows the business or the bank access – in this way, phenomenon that can be perceived as the spread of the ‘Empire’ actually only can occur in the continued presence of the sovereign states-system (Bull 254, 262). If the ‘Empire’s’ prerogative to use force is based around the idea of maintaining a just outcome, the states-system must be recognized in order to determine the justness of any inter-regional relations, war, or exploitation (Hart 10, 18; L. 12/7). Ultimately, a ‘society of control’ is not desirable since it will remove the control from the populace (and its representatives) of any one region or country. While it is clear that under ‘Empire’ the entire globe obviously won’t have the same laws and cultural diversity will remain somewhat; a sacrifice of control, self-determination, and freedom would need to be made by the entire population of the ‘Empire’ – in short, it will be less just than the current international states-system, which is to say it will be a very grim result (L. 12/7). The question of the ‘Empire’s’ success will hinge on ideology and whether the ‘Empire’ has the ‘biopower’ required to instill widespread complacency in the global population (Hart 23).

In the late 1940’s and the 1950’s, the states-system was buttressed by the presence of modern, disciplinary societies (L. 12/7). This was largely a result of the Cold War and the US’s worldwide attempt to combat communism (Hart 178-180). During the Cold War, according to Foucault, there was a paradigm shift from sovereign societies to more governmentally controlled societies (L. 12/7). This type of social control is realized through the production and re-production of a certain ‘normality’, through the use of narrative, around which optimal social norms are based (Campbell 173). Self discipline came about from the normalizing and socializing processes along with surveillance, and informal social sanctions serve to reinforce this phenomenon (L. 12/7). As a result of the democratic activity in the sixties and seventies, the ‘disciplinary society’ was actively rejected and began to break down (Campbell 182, Hart 276). The discrete structures, identities, and social roles involved in the reinforcement of the ‘disciplinary society’ hybridized and began to constantly change, and as a result of increased technology, immaterial labor, and sharing of information they became more diversified and intertwined (Campbell 180, 185; Hart 273). This transition from a more disciplinary society to the current state-of-affairs has resulted in decentralization in power, where control is distributed over networks, as a result of the removal of emphasis from discrete concepts of structure, discipline, identity, and normality, or so proponents of the ‘society of control’ or ‘Empire’ theories of the current state-of-affairs would claim (L. 12/7). In reality, the current state-of-affairs has tendencies that align with the ‘society of control’, but the current trend of nationalism around the world serves to preserve some centralized control characteristic of the ‘disciplinary society’. In places like India, the US, and France; nationalism is a powerful political motivator for the majority. A return to centralized control, as we have seen in the US recently (Patriot Act, ‘Bush doctrine’), evidence nationalism’s ability to retain some of the structure and expectations of normality that are characteristic of a ‘disciplinary society’.

Some may claim that nationalism cannot overcome the network flows between states that are part of ‘Empire’, a phenomenon that arguably forces the decentralization of power (L. 12/7). There are examples that prove this contention incorrect though. France and China, for example, have diplomatic or economic ties to countries like Iran and Venezuela, who actively reject the spread of ‘biopower’ and capitalism, reinforcing the traditional states-system. Furthermore, when transnational interests like companies and banks do business in many countries it can be seen as a mechanism of ‘Empire’ – in reality the businesses and banks, such as the oil giants or the IMF, only do business in sovereign, and more or less stable, states (Bull 262). This reinforces the state’s sovereignty by recognizing it as the regulator of trade – even trade groups, like NAFTA; reinforce statehood by only including certain states, and excluding other states. The exclusion of some states from these ‘networks’, like Belarus’ rejection of the EU, seems to be evidence that ‘Empire’ theorists, who claim there are no physical boundaries of Empire, are incorrect in many instances. This is evidenced simply by observing the EU spending money on fortifying its boundary with Belarus and northern Africa instead of increasing their networks with these states.

In practice; many things that seem to be evidence of the presence of an ‘Empire’, such as the rise of transnational entities; actually preserve and rely on the presence of a traditional states-system. In fact, many of the concepts of justice in international politics derive their meaning from the implied presence of a states-system. If one believes there is currently a ‘society of control’, then the ‘Empire’ would be using force unilaterally to enforce state conduct in the name of ‘justice’ (Hart 10, 18). It is true that the US can be seen as acting sometimes as a unilateral police force, but this does not mean there is ‘Empire’. Many believe that ‘Empire’ would mean a greater and lasting peace as competing imperialist powers would no longer be warring with each other. Unfortunately, the entire framework of just inter-state relations is based around the states-system and recognizes each state as being sovereign and having rights. Furthermore, if the boundaries and jurisdictions are deemphasized by increased networking and economic ties between states, it still remains to be proven that intra-ethnic or intra-regional violent conflict wouldn’t simply replace the intra-national level conflict of yesteryear – conversely, if we move into a period of worldwide peace or prosperity, it doesn’t necessarily follow that it is resulting from increased networking or that a weakening of the traditional state’s power has occurred or is related to the peace (Bull 263).

A ‘society of control’ or ‘Empire’ is not a desirable mode of international politics. It is unlike democracy since instead of being shaped by the citizens’ wills, it shapes the citizens’ wills in a pre-determined manner that is always re-productive to that same ‘Empire’. It reduces an individual’s control, freedom, ability to self-determine; their only autonomy exists within the scope of what actions are beneficial to the continued existence of ‘Empire’. In order to make up for the sacrifice of certain autonomies, rewards are offered to less fortunate blocks of the ‘society of control’ in order to help insure the successful spread of the ‘Empire’ through the positive feedback of ‘biopower’. Local and regional identity and nationalism can contribute to conflict, but they are also often necessary psychological social tools in order to rally the populace behind an action or cause, for survival during a war, an economic downturn, or another trying, society-wide occurrence. The sacrifices in variety, pride, and self-determination would be too much to ask of many in the hypothetical ‘Empire’ – if it is ever proliferated fully it will certainly fracture as many of the sacrifices it expects from the global society and go against human rights otherwise assumed to be inherent with existence on the earth as a human being. This sleight-of-hand of the ‘society of control’ will cause fracturing and violent reactions once it has been realized in a bona fide way.

Works Cited

Bull, Hedley. Anarchical Society .New York City: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Campbell, David. Writing Security. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

(L.) Lecture at the Watson Institute - December 7, 2006. T.A. Jacque Amoureux.

Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.